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The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on
Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part I)
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY*

On February 21, 1975 the Second Reading of a New Convention on
the Carriage of Goods by Sea, intended to replace the existing
Convention of 1924 known as The Hague Rules, was completed by the
Working Group on Merchant Shipping Legislation of UNCITRAL. 1
Preparation of this new text "by UNCITRAL" has been underway since
April 1970. During this time a very wide debate, in a forum designed to
accommodate the interests of shippers as well as shipowners, considered
the accumulated problems of fifty years of operations under the Hague
Rules and attempted to reach solutions which would not impede
developments in the industry as we now see them.
This article is not an official statement of the views of the United
States Government, nor is it an expression of the official views of any
other government or the U.N. Secretariat but merely represents an
analysis of the Draft Convention based on the personal notes taken by
the author during the discussions.
In accordance with the wise practices of the United Nations, decisions
within UNCITRAL are normally reached by consensus 2 with a mini* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Member of the Editorial Board; United
States Representative to the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Sessions of the
Working Group. The author is grateful for the assistance of his students, Michael J. Egelhof and
Thomas J. Hawley of the Class of 1975, Fordham Law School.
'The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The Draft
Convention will be considered by the full Commission in April, 1976. Thereafter the text will be
considered by the Sixth Committee and the United Nations General Assembly prior to the
convening of a diplomatic conference, probably in 1977. The leader of the UNCITRAL Secretariat
during the substantive sessions of the Working Group was Professor John 0. Honnold of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. The Chairman of the Third Session was Nagendra Singh of
India, now Judge of the International Court of Justice; of the Fourth and Fifth Sessions, Professor
Jose Domingo Ray of Argentina; of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Sessions, Professor Mohsen
Chafik of Egypt.
2The history of voting procedures at international conferences, starting with unanimity and
quasi-unanimity prescribed for the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and continuing through the
two-thirds majority rule of the League of Nations and some early U.N. Conferences and ending with
the consensus rule now adopted for the Third Law of the Sea Conference is clearly traced in Sohn,
Voting Procedures in United Nations Conferences for the Codification of International Law, 69
Am. J. Int'l L. 310-353 (1975).
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mum amount of indicative voting. No verbatim transcript is made of the
discussion, nor do the Reports reflect the identity of the speakers or the
exact nature of the support received by proposals. Because of this strong
precedent the author first attempted to prepare this article reflecting the
use of the current expressions of U.N. terminology to describe the
positions taken by the member states' delegations, but this proved to be
inordinately complex and even misleading. Accordingly, it was decided
to go beyond the official records to ascribe positions to delegations solely
as an informal guide for decision makers so that the entire transportation
industry can easily understand the strength of the positions taken and the
wisdom of the compromises achieved. It is the hope of the author that a
thorough understanding of the debates on the merits of proposals will
lead to a reasoned and favorable judgment on the new text.
I. HARMONIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
LAW BY THE C.M.I.: THE HAGUE RULES
From its very beginnings, the organizers of the Comit Maritime
International3 recognized the importance of a harmonization of the law
whereby risk of loss between carrier and cargo owner would be
determined. The underlying hostility between these co-participants in
maritime adventures clearly emerged during the first discussions of the
Collision Damages Draft Convention in the last years of the nineteenth
century when the question being considered was the right of the innocent
cargo owner, whose cargo had been damaged in a collision, to sue the
4
owners of both colliding vessels, jointly and severally, for his entire loss.
In the economic warfare between cargo and carrier a truce of sorts had
been achieved in the United States in the 1893 legislation, The Harter
Act 5 which had been the model for Legislation in Australia 6 New
Zealand 7 and Canada,8 nations of the British Empire in which the cargo
owning interest was stronger than the ship owning interest. The
traditional maritime states of Europe, all shipowning nations, feared the
spread of legislative solutions to the risk of loss problem. Thus, after the
3The Comit Maritime International (C.M.I.) was organized in 1897 as an outgrowth of the
International Law Association for maritime specialists: lawyers, underwriters and shipowners, but
not shippers, in the beginning.
' See C.M.I. Bull. Vol. 1 pp. 30, 60; Vol. 2 pp. 6, 39. In United States law, the liability of the
two colliding vessels to cargo carried on either vessel is joint and several. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302
(1876); The Alabama and The Gamecock, 92 U.S. 695 (1875). Cf. The Milan, 167 Eng. Rpts. 167
(1861).
546 U.S.C. 190-196 (1974).
6 Australia C.O.G.S.A. (1904). 3 Commonwealth Acts, 37.
'New Zealand Shipping & Seamen Act (1908). No. 178.
8
Canada Water Carriage Act (1910). 9 & 10 Edward VII, c. 61.
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successful conclusion of the new international rules on Collision
Damages9 and Salvage' 0 in 1910, the C.M.I. prepared to take up the
subject of the allocation of risk of loss between carrier and cargo by way
of an international convention which would regulate the ocean bill of
lading. This work of international harmonization was suspended during
the First World War (1914-1918) which caused great losses to international shipping because of submarine warfare, blockades and nationalizations. After the war a draft convention based on the compromises
contained in the United States Harter Act was circulated and formed the
basis for the Hague Conference of September, 1921 at which the Hague
Rules were adopted for voluntary inclusion in bills of lading to be offered
to cargo owners by the ship owners, under pressure from insurance
underwriters.II
The Harter Act was a piece of reform legislation deriving its force
from the same desire to preserve a free market place as the Sherman
Anti Trust Act of 1890.12 It was a radical interference with the illusory
freedom of contract whereby shipowners offered printed form bills of
lading, containing many exculpatory clauses, as contracts of affreightment. The United States Supreme Court had indicated a public policy
objection to some of the more outrageous forms of clauses whereby
3
carriers sought to exempt themselves from their own negligence.'
The essence of the truce, or compromise, of 1893 was the legislated
warranty of seaworthiness in the form of a duty of the shipowner to
exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy 14 in exchange for the
preservation of the traditional common law defenses: ... "acts of God,
or public enemies, or the inherent defect, quality, or vice of the thing
carried," 15 and the addition of the policy based defense of negligent
16
navigation or management of the vessel.
'International
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to
Collisions between Vessels, September 23, 1910. N. Singh, International Conventions of Merchant
Shipping 1047 (1963).
10International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law respecting Assistance
and Salvage at Sea, September 23, 1910. 37 Stat. 1658 (1913), T.S. No. 576.
'A. Knauth, Ocean Bills of Lading, 115-131 (4th ed. 1953).
12 15 U.S.C. 1-7 (1974).
13 Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U.S. 397 (1889). Respecting

clauses exempting corporate defendants from their own negligence, it should be noted that the United
States Supreme Court has indicated that such clauses will not be enforced because of a strong public
policy against them. See Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp. 349 U.S. 85 (1955), and Boston Metals
Co. v. The Winding Gulf 349 U.S. 122 (1955), both cases being concerned with towage.
"46 U.S.C. 191 (1974).
"546 U.S.C. 192 (1974), "dangers of the sea of other navigable waters, acts of God, or public
enemies, or the inherent defect, quality or vice of the thing carried, or from insufficiency of package,
or seizure under legal process . . . "
,1 Id. "faults or errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel."
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While the essence of this compromise was preserved in the voluntary
Hague Rules, the drafting of these rules was more heavily influenced by
lawyers for shipowning interests who were able to alter the burden of
proof in disaster cases 17 and spell out the list of defenses 8 in such a way
that these defenses took on an independent meaning.
The Voluntary Hague Rules of 1921 became the Mandatory Rules of
1924 at the conclusion of the Diplomatic Conference of August, 1924 in
Brussels which also endorsed an international convention on the
limitation of shipowner's liability.' 9 Despite the widespread agreement in
1924 in the maritime industry concerning the need for the international
convention it did not come into force until 1931, one year after the
deposit of ratifications by the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium and
Hungary. 20 In 1935 the United States began steps to ratify an amended
version of the Hague Rules, United States ratification becoming
effective after the enactment of domestic legislation. 2' A similar
situation occurred in France. 22 Thereafter other traditional maritime
states, including the Scandinavian countries completed the ratification
23
process.
Dissatisfaction with the 1924 Hague Rules has come from two
dissimilar sources: the traditional maritime states and the newly
independent states of the developing world in Asia and Africa.
The traditional maritime nations (the shipowning nations) realized
that the rules for unit limitation of liability which depended on shipments
in boxes, bales or bags, appropriate for sailing ships as well as
liberty-ships and victory-ships which had been built for wartime usage in
1917-1918 and 1944-1945, could not easily be accommodated to
containerized shipping. The worldwide depression had already unsettled
the monetary value of the unit limitation rule 24 so that wide disparities
"2The Article III duty to render the vessel seaworthy is made subject to the Article IV defenses.
This language has been stricken from the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 46 U.S.C.
1303 and the U.S. ratification of the Hague Rules is subject to reservation on this point.
18 The list of defenses, other than the policy based defenses of negligent navigation and
management (Article IV 2(a)) and fire (Article IV 2(b)), is a catalogue of defenses, each of which has
its own case law: perils of the sea, act of God, act of War, act of public enemies, arrest or restraint of
princes, quarantine, act or omission of the shipper, strikes, riots, saving life or property at sea,
inherent vice of the goods, insufficient packing, insufficient marks and latent defects not
discoverable by due diligence (Article IV 2(c)-(p).)
19International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Limitation of
Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, August 25, 1924. N. Singh, supra, note 9 at 1058.
20 A. Knauth, 73.
2146 U.S.C. 1300-1313 (1974).
22 Loidu 2 avril 1936; See P. Chauveau, Trait6 de Droit Maritime 495-502 (1958).
23 A. Knauth, Id.
2446 U.S.C. 1304 (5) (1974). Article IV (5) of the Hague Rules limited carrier liability to £100
per package or unit. United States legislation, however, provides for a limitation of $500 per
customary freight unit.
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existed even under the laws of those states which were parties to the
Hague Rules. Furthermore, the method of determining the unit was
subject to variant interpretations. 2 There were also problems respecting
the time bar or statute of limitations, especially as it concerned recourse
actions in transshipment situations. Lastly, there had been considerable
problems in applying the law of Agency to the Hague Rules, reflected in
The Muncaster Castle2 6 and The Himalaya decisions. 27 The Muncaster
Castle problem concerns the non-delegable nature of the shipowner's
duty to use due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, it being the desire
of the traditional maritime states to transform that duty into a duty to
make a careful selection of ship repairers. The Himalaya problem
concerns the use of the carrier defenses-especially the unit
limitation-by other parties to the maritime transaction such as the
Master, Officers and crew of the vessel where wilful acts are involved.
Finally there is the question of the use of carrier defenses by Stevedores.2 8
The dissatisfaction of the traditional maritime states led to an
examination of the question of proposed changes to the Hague Rules at
the C.M.I. Rijeka Plenary Conference in 1959 where the decision was
taken to seek an amending protocol to the existing rules. Work on the
new rules, proceeded over the next four years and a text was approved by
a Sub-committee of CM I at the historic Swedish resort of Visby 29 so that
the CMI proposals came to be referred to as the Visby Rules. The Visby
Rules were approved by the C.M.I.'s Stockholm Plenary Conference in
1963 and the Belgian Government convened the Diplomatic Conference
to consider these amendments in May, 1967 and an adjourned session in
February, 1968. The Brussels Protocol of Amendments to the Hague
Rules was finally signed on February 23, 1968, but there have been few
30
ratifications, and as of this time (May, 1975) it is not in effect.
Dissatisfaction of the developing world stems essentially from the
belief that the operation of traditional maritime law (along with other
aspects of international trade law) impairs the balance of payments
position of developing states so as to insure continued poverty and
perpetual under-development in an industrial age. In the field of
25

There is uncertainty as to the effect of weight in determining the proper size unit. The concept

of the package doctrine fit much earlier modes of transport by boxes, bales and bags, but
immediately became unsuitable for the ever larger units of shipment on pallets or in containers.
26 Riverstone Meat Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Lancashire Shipping Co. Ltd. (1961) A.C. 807.
27
The Himalaya. (Adler v. Dickson) [1955] 12.B.158.
28 Scruttons v. Midland Silicones Ltd. (1962) A.C. 446.
21 Visby, a powerful city of the Hanseatic League, preserves a maritime code of the Fourteenth
Century which is usually cited as a principal source of Scandinavian Maritime Law. The Code of
Visby is translated in 30 Fed. Cas 1189.
36 Norway, and Sweden have ratified; Singapore and Syria have adhered.
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traditional maritime law this dissatisfaction is clearly spelled out in the1
UNCTAD Secretariat Report on Bills of Lading of 14 December 1970.3
A summary of the developed country objections might be that the
allocation of risks in the Hague Rules3 2 is already slanted too much in
favor of carriers while the further protection of the unit limitation of
liability 33 together with the possibility of over-all limitation of shipowner
liability3 4 tips the balance so much in the shipowner's favor that it must
necessarily have affected the cost of insurance, although no compensation is given by way of lower freight rates for shippers. It has also been
argued that alteration of the balance of risks in favor of shippers should
not lead to additional costs of operations for shipowners so as to lead to
an increase in the freight rate.33 This, however, is surely debatable in
view of the long time spans required to build a history of claims
36
experience as a foundation of proper rate making.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS AS A FORUM FOR MARITIME
QUESTIONS: UNCTAD AND UNCITRAL
It was in the context of dissatisfactions with the Hague Rules by
carriers and shippers that a major change in the sources of international
maritime law occurred in the United Nations in two new organizations:
UNCTAD and UNCITRAL. No international organization now exists
(or has ever existed) which can deal with all aspects of the uses of the seas
in maritime commerce.
The scope of IMCO's3 7 charter may eventually be interpreted to
include more commercial matters than are presently considered there,
but generally the scope of IMCO's operations is technical rather than
31 Doc. No. TD/B/C.4/ISL/6.
32

The fact that the carrier's Article III duties to the cargo are subject to the defenses of Article

IV, together with the policy based defenses of negligent navigation and management and fire in
Article IV (2) (a) and (b).
31 Article IV (5).
34 See fn. 19 supra.
35 Hellawell, Less Developed Countries and Developed Countries' Law: Problems from the Law
of Admiralty. 7 Col. J. Transnat. L. 203-50 (1968).
36 Marine (and Inland Marine) Underwriters prefer a five year claims experience as the basis for
rate making, thus it is likely that the premium for cargo insurance might not decrease very much
while the premium for the shipowner's P. & I. (Protection and Indemnity) insurance would probably
increase for a few years. For an excellent discussion of marine insurance, see L. Buglass, Marine
Insurance and General Average (1971) and C. McDowell, & H. Gibbs Ocean Transportation
(1954).
"The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, established in 1958 when the
multilateral convention setting up the organization finally received the necessary ratifications.
IMCO headquarters are in London; every major maritime power being among the 75 member
states. Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, March 6, 1948.
[19581 U.S.T. 621; T.I.A.S. No. 4044; 289 U.N.T.S. 48. Article I.
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commercial. In that regard, IMCO took over the functions of a number
of public international law conventions concerned with actual vessel
operations such as load lines, 38 safety of life at sea and ship construction, 39 and rules of the road.4 0 The C.M.I., 41 organized in 1897, had
prepared a series of private international law conventions on maritime
commercial matters such as collision damages, 42 salvage, 43 limitation of
shipowners liability, 44 arrest of vessels in civil cases, 45 and maritime liens
and ship mortgages. 46 The IMCO Conventions on the subject of oil
pollution by vessels represents the joint effort of these two organizations
to arrive at a satisfactory solution to a pressing environmental
47
problem.
At the outset it is necessary to make a clear distinction between
UNCTAD and UNCITRAL as new sources of maritime law.
UNCTAD,48 established in 1964, is an organization in which all 138
members of the United Nations are entitled to participate. It owes its
origins to the demands of the developing world for a greater share in the
riches of the industrial world, as guaranteed by the U.N. Charter.
UNCTAD is an organ of the General Assembly, meeting at three year
intervals, with a permanent organ the 55 member Trade and Development Board and a permanent Secretariat. At the First United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva, 23 March to 16 June
1964, Special Principle XII was agreed to, as follows:
"All countries should cooperate in devising measures to help developing countries to build up maritime and other means of transport
for their economic development, to ensure the unhindered use of in"' International Convention on Load Lines, April 5, 1966 [1967] 2 U.S.T. 1857; T.I.A.S. No.
6331; 640 U.N.T.S. 133.
31 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, June 17, 1960. [1965] 1 U.S.T. 185;
T.I.A.S. No. 5780; 536 U.N.T.S. 27.
40 Annex B to the 1960 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.
"The C.M.I. is made up of maritime law associations in 228 countries. Since 1897 C.M.I.
prepared thirteen private international law conventions on maritime matters.
42 See fn. 9 supra.
' 3 See fn. 10 supra.
4" See fn. 19 supra.
11 International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Seagoing Ships, Mary 10, 1952, N. Singh,
supra note 9 at 1126.
"1International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Maritime
Liens and Mortgages, April 10, 1926, N. Singh, supra note 9 at 1087.
11Draft International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, November 28,
1969, 1 J. Marit. L. & Comm. 373 (1970); Draft International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, December 18, 1971, 3 J. Marit.
L. & Comm. 624 (1972).
"The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). To assist its work in
maritime matters the permanent UNCTAD secretariat has established the Joint Shipping
Legislative Unit at Geneva. See generally U.N.Y.B. (1964) 195-207.
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ternational transport facilities, the improvement of terms of freight and
insurance for the developing countries, and to promote tourism in these
countries in order to increase their earnings and reduce their expenditure
on invisible trade."
The Second Conference at New Delhi, 1 February to 29 March 1968,
adopted ten resolutions relating to shipping, among which was a
resolutio-n for the creation of a Working Group on international shipping
legislation. 49 Pursuant to these decisions the UNCTAD Working Group
was established in December, 1969 with first priority given to a study of
bills of lading to be completed prior to the February, 1971 meeting of the
Working Group.
At that 1971 Session the Working Group was armed with a lengthy
study of problems in bills of lading and was preparing to go ahead with
the work.5 " However, it was at this point that the emergence of
UNCITRAL capability in this area of international maritime law
brought about the shift of the legal questions arising out of bills of lading
to UNCITRAL while UNCTAD's activities in the area of shipping
concentrated on the Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, Port
Development, Combined (or Multi-modal) Transport of Goods, Merchant Marine Development, Freight Rates and legal and economic
questions in charter parties, marine insurance and general average. At
the time the decision to discontinue the work on bills of lading in
UNCTAD seemed wise in view of the opposition which the proposals on
international shipping legislation had encountered. 5 1 Now, in retrospect,
the foresight of the decision has been proven in that UNCITRAL has
produced a Draft Convention free of the political and economic discords
which have occasionally appeared in the larger body, UNCTAD.
UNCITRAL is a much smaller organization, a commission, meeting
annually, of 36 states elected to membership on regional principles by the
General Assembly. 52 It is also an organ of the General Assembly
reporting to the General Assembly itself, having been established in
1966, with its first session at New York from 29 January to 26 February
1968.11 It owes its origins to the felt needs for cooperation and
harmonization in the field of East-West trade, perceived and urged by
Hungary in the General Assembly, but it also fulfills the U.N. Charter
mandate for the progressive harmonization and unification of international trade law.
" U.N.Y.B. (1968). 375 The vote by roll call was 73 to 19 with 5 abstaining.
50Bills of Lading, Report by Unctad Secretariat, TD/B/C.4/ISL/6 of 14 December 1970.
51U.N.Y.B. (1968). 375. See fn. 49 Supra.
-2 U.N.Y.B. (1966).
920.
53U.N.Y.B.

(1968). 837.
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From its beginnings UNCITRAL had confined its work to three
priority items: international sales of goods, international payments, and
commercial arbitration. Largely because of this decision on UNCITRAL priorities the Second UNCTAD Conference, by a divided vote,
had moved to establish the Working Group on International Shipping
Legislation, however, at the second session of UNCITRAL in March,
1969 the subject of international shipping legislation was added to
UNCTAD's priority items, 5 4 thereafter it required several discussions to
determine the composition of the working group for shipping in order to
insure that there was a proper representation to commercial interests as
well as regional blocs. The original Working Group on International
Legislation on Shipping was composed of only seven members, 55 but at
the fourth session of UNCITRAL in March 1971 the objections raised
by a great many interests were satisfied by the enlargement of the
Working Group on International Legislation on Shipping to twenty one
members.5 The Working Group on International Legislation on Shipping thereafter held six substantive sessions from January, 1972 to
February, 1975 during which the Draft Convention was prepared.

III. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. The Period of CarrierResponsibility: Before and After the Ocean
Voyage.
The problem first dealt with was the question to what extent the scope
of the Hague Rules should be modified to increase protection for
shippers against clauses in bills of lading relieving carriers of responsibility for loss or damage to cargo in the periods not covered by the Hague
U.N.Y.B. (1971) 595.
5 Chile, Egypt, Ghana, India, U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S.A.
5
"The following states were members of the Working Group for all sessions: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, France, Ghana, Hungary, India, Japan, Nigeria, Norway,
Poland, Singapore, Tanzania, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, U.S.A., and Zaire. Spain attended the
third fourth and fifth sessions but was replaced by the Federal Republic of Germany for the sixth,
seventh and eighth sessions. Of the 21 members chosen in 1971 five were among the ten largest
shipowning nations, both by tennage and by number of ships: Japan, Norway. U.K., U.S.S.R. and
U.S.A. (Germany, chosen in 1974, makes six.) Other states from the list often largest shipowners,
not members of the Working Group were: Liberia, Greece, Panama and Italy. The situation in
1975 has not changed appreciably except that France has changed places with Germany in fleet
size by gross tonnage. The statistics are published annually in Lloyd's Register of Shipping. The
documentation of the Working Group is found in the U.N. Doc. series A/CN.9/numbers 63. 74,
76, 88, 96 and 105.
-1
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Rules which, by negative definition, had limited carrier responsibility to
57
the "tackle to tackle" period.
The Working Group considered the question on the basis of the
Report of the Secretary General.5 8 Two problems concerning the
operation of existing Article I(e) of the Hague Rules were cited:
(1) Doubt as to whether the rules apply to loss or damage occurring
during loading or unloading operations, to which the Report offered a
suggested draft, as follows,
"Carriage of goods covers the period from the commencement of loading
operations until the completion of discharge of the goods from the ship." 59
(2) The fact that the existing rules do not cover loss or damage
occurring prior to loading or subsequent to discharge even while goods
are in the charge or control of the carrier or its agents, to which the
Report offered a suggested modification of the above suggested draft,
"Carriage of goods' covers the period from the time the goods are [in
charge of] [accepted for carriage] [received by] the carrier to the time of
their delivery." 60
The Plenary session quickly established a consensus on two points:
(1) The Hague Rules should be extended rather than merely clarified,
so that the carrier would be liable for the entire period during which he
was actually in charge of goods.
(2) The period of responsibility under the Hague Rules should not
begin prior to carrier's custody at port of loading and should not
continue beyond port of discharge.
It was further agreed that the suggested text should serve as a basis for
work of the Drafting Party in developing a draft text to reflect the
consensus on the above points. It subsequently developed that exact
precision on the length of the period of carrier responsibility would be
very difficult to put into language which would satisfy a majority of
members.
Japan questioned the entire approach whereby the question of the
57Article I (e) achieves the exclusion of portions of the transit other than the ocean voyage
through a pseudo-definition of carriage of goods as, "the period from the time when the goods are
loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship."
58 "Responsibility of Ocean Carriers for Cargo: bills of lading" Doe. No. A/CN.9/63/Add. 1.
11 Id. Para.26.
60 Id. Para.37.
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carrier's liability would be strictly defined by the Convention, believing
that the matter should be left to private agreements between carrier and
shipper, so that account could be taken of the circumstances peculiar to
each port.
Norway noted that a landward extension of the carrier's liability
beyond the port of loading or discharging would not be desirable, and
presented a Draft Proposal, as follows
"Carriage of goods covers the entire period during which the goods are in
the custody of the carrier from the time of receipt of the goods at the port
of loading until the time of delivery of the goods at the port of discharge."
In its reply to the Secretariat Questionnaire, Norway had said.
"The question whether the scope of application of the rules on carriers'
liability should be extended beyond the period now fixed by art. l(e) of the
Convention, would in the opinion of the Norwegian Government depend
to some extent on the content of the liability rules in question. Assuming
that the liability of the carrier would be based on the principles now
contained in the Convention in particular in art. 4(2)q and 4(5), the period
during which the carrier should be responsible for the goods, could be
extended to cover the periods before the loading or after the discharge
during which the goods were in the custody and control of the carrier and
his agents. In the opinion of the Norwegian Government, however, such an
extension of the period of responsibility should be considered in connection with the question relating to the liability of terminal operators and
warehousemen."
Argentina agreed with the Secretariat's Draft solutions, noting that
the Argentinian courts had interpreted the carrier liability to begin with
the actual reception of the goods by the carrier and terminating with the
delivery, unless a customs warehouse were involved. Brazil objected to
the term "delivery," essentially because of customs problems, and
offered a proposed draft,
"Carriage of goods covers the period from taking charge of them for
loading operations until the completion of discharge of the goods from the
ship or from any port depository or other facilities operated or owned by
the carrier or his agents."
Chile felt that the carrier liability should begin with the commencement of loading operations until the actual delivery by the carrier.
Ghana raised the question whether the nature of the carrier's liability
ought not to be different when the goods were not onboard a vessel but
were on the dock or in a warehouse in view of the fact that more factors
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were outside the carrier's control in sea transport than in air or rail, and
proposed a substitute for the existing Article VII of the Hague Rules, as
follows
1. "Nothing herein contained shall prevent a carrier or shipper from
entering into any agreement, stipulation or condition, as to the responsibility and liability of the carrier or the ship for the loss or damage to or in
connection with the custody and care and handling of goods prior to the
loading on and subsequent to the discharge from the ship on which the
goods are carried by sea.
PROVIDED that where the carrier accepts custody for the goods prior to
the loading and subsequent to their discharge from the ship, any clause,
convenant, or agreement relieving the carrier of liability for loss or
damage to or in connection with goods arising from the actual fault or
privity of the carrier, his servants, or agents shall be null and void and of
no effect.
2. Where [during the period] prior to the loading on or subsequent to the
discharge from the ship the carrier is, by the municipal law of the port
authority, required to [relinquish] [give] custody or control of the goods to
such authority, its servants, agents or other permitted operator, the carrier
shall not be responsible for the goods during such period as the goods are
in such custody of control.
Nigeria, however, urged that the ocean carrier should be liable for
cargo damage at least from the commencement of loading operations
until the completion of discharge from the ship unless the carrier
remained in actual custody and control of the goods at the port of
loading or discharge in which case the carrier responsibility should
continue.
The United States noted that under its domestic legislation, the Harter
Act extended the carrier's period of liability during his custody of the
6
goods, both before loading and after discharge. 1
The Harter Act liabilities before loading and after discharge are
created by the language in section one forbidding exculpatory clauses
61Carrier liability

before loading and after discharge is in accordance with the Harter Act where

applicable by reason of transport from the United States (46 USC 190, 191). Where the Harter Act
does not apply and COGSA liability under the "tackle to tackle" rule is not in force, the situation
respecting liabilities depends upon whether the cargo leaves the custody of the carrier or his agent.
Thus, in Standard Brands Inc. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 42 F. Supp. 43 (D. Mass., 1941) the carrier
is liable for loss occurring to the cargo while in its warehouse, although the shipper must plead and
prove carrier negligence. See also North American Smelting Co. v. Moller Steamship Co., 204 F.2d
384 (3rd Cir., 1953). However, where the carrier discharges into the mandatory custody of the Port
Authority, the carrier's liability will have ceased. Tan Hi v. U.S., 94 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
See also Miami Structural Iron Corp. v. Cie Nationale Beige de T.M., 224 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1955);
The Milwaukee Bridge, 26 F.2d 327 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied, 278 U.S. 672 (1928). See generally,
Chiang, The Applicability of COGSA and the Harter Act to Water Bills of Lading, 14 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 267 (1972).
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relieving the carrier from liability for losses from "... negligence, fault
or failure in proper loading, stowage, custody, care, or proper delivery..." of cargo (Emphasis added from 46 USC 190) and the language
in section two forbidding exculpatory clauses lessening the carrier's
obligations of due diligence to ".... carefully handle and stow her cargo
and to carefor and properly deliver same... " (Emphasis added from
46 USC 191).
This did not mean, however, that the "tackle to tackle" definition of
ocean carriage in the Hague Rules was unreasonable at the time it was
adopted. The 1924 Convention was concerned solely with bills of lading
in ocean transport, and at that time the majority of vessels issuing bills of
lading were general cargo ships operating either in liner service or as
tramp steamers. It was not possible then to reconcile the operations of
liner vessels where there were usually considerable shoreside establishments, often including warehousing facilities at each port of call, with the
more casual operations of tramp steamers often dependent on shoreside
facilities provided by the shipper himself or some other authority. Also,
transport by multi-purpose container was unknown in 1924 so that the
international transport industry could ignore the problems of through
transport of goods involving road, rail, air and ocean segments. The
language chosen in 1924 was the best resolution as of that time of the
different circumstances of the shipping industry, concentrating on the
operations of the vessel herself regardless of whether the vessel operator
was a liner company or a single ship tramp operator.
Nevertheless, the United States believed that it would be appropriate
to change the Hague Rules now, and could certainly not recommend a
period of carrier liability any less than that already provided in domestic
law. The United States recommended the deletion of Article I(e), the
tackle to tackle rule, and a reformulation of the carrier's duties to read as
follows,
"The carrier shall properly and carefully take over, load, handle, stow,
carry, keep, discharge and hand over the goods in his charge."
France explained its 1966 legislation, 6 2 and offered it as a model for
the new rules. French law took note of five phases wherein the carrier's
liability remained the same: the taking over of the goods, the loading of
the goods, the carriage of the goods in the ship, the discharge of the
goods and the dispatch of the goods for delivery to the consignee. France
believed it to be essential to unify the responsibility rules also with
11 Law

No. 66-420 of 18 Jun 66; Decree No. 66-1078 of 31 Dec 66.
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respect to the port authority, whether public or private. France offered a
draft proposal, as follows:
1. "Carriage of goods" covers the period from the time the goods are
taken in charge at the port of loading until their delivery at the port of
discharge.
2. The carrier shall be deemed to have taken charge of the goods when
they have been accepted by him, his servant or any other person acting on
his instructions, and
3. The carrier shall be deemed to have delivered the goods when he has
[placed them at the disposal of] [produced them to] the consignee or any
other person either pursuant to the instructions of the consignee or
pursuant to the rules or usages of the port of discharge.
Spain, however, took the position that the carrier should be liable at
all stages of his actual control of the goods from the time of reception
until the time of delivery.
Australia noted that the question of port authority liability was very
difficult. Perhaps neither the carrier nor the cargo owner would be in a
good position with respect to such authorities.
Australia suggested that the carrier should be liable from the time the
goods leave the custody of the consignor until they come into the custody
of the consignee, with the carrier responsible for insuring them while in
the custody of port authorities, stevedores or others.
The United Kingdom felt it could support the Secretariat Draft so
long as there was no attempt to go beyond purely maritime carriage to
some sort of combined transport scheme. The U.K. government's
response to the questionnaire had sought to balance liability with
physical control and considered that such a proposed solution might
delay revision of the rules almost indefinitely. Thus, the response stated,
The Government of the United Kingdom regard it as most important that
any revision of the Hague Rules should not increase the overall costs of
world trade, in particular by increasing loss of cargo through lack of
adequate care. It is their view that loss and damage are generally
minimised by matching as closely as possible responsibility for and
physical control of cargoes. If therefore liability is to be placed on the
carrier for the period in which the goods are under the control of
stevedores, warehousemen, etc., it would seem essential that the carrier
should have a right of recourse against such parties for any loss occuring
while the goods were in their custody who in turn should perhaps be able to
limit their liability to the same extent that the carrier can. The
establishment of a general rule for this will be a difficult exercise going
rather outside the scope of maritime law into more purely domestic
legislations; furthermore, in the United Kingdom at least the situation is
complicated by the great variety in the legal status of such bailees and the
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Government of the United Kingdom anticipate that considerable work will
be necessary to establish suitable rules world-wide. However, they would
be in favor of a solution along these lines.
The U.K. solution to the problem could be simply framed,
"Subject to the provisions of Article V there shall be no liability on the
carrier for loss or damage to goods at the port of loading, during the
carriage or at the port of discharge except in accordance with these rules."
This proposal was similar to the proposal of the International
Chamber of Shipping, however, consideration of this provision was
deferred and not taken up again.
India had replied to the questionnaire that the Hague Rules should be
applicable during the entire period that the goods are under the control
or custody of the carrier. This liability would begin with the delivery by
the consignor to the carrier or his agent for the purpose of being carried
by the ship and would continue until delivery by the carrier or his agent
to the consignee. India also noted that a new convention would be
necessary to provide for port authority liability.
The Soviet Union began by noting that the reasons for making
changes in the international convention must be proven, but stated that
under Soviet law the carrier was liable for loss or damage to cargo from
the point of loading to the point of delivery to the consignee, although the
carrier was permitted to contract out of this liability.
The Drafting Party 6 3 using the Secretariat's proposed draft as the
basic text, reached agreement on the following text:
(i) "Carriage of goods" covers the period during which the goods are in the
charge of the carrier at the port of loading, during the carriage, and at the
port of discharge.
(ii) For the purpose of paragraph (i), the carrier shall be deemed to be in
charge of the goods from the time the carrier has taken over the goods
until the time the carrier has delivered the goods:
(a) by handing over the goods to the consignee; or
(b) in cases when the consignee does not receive the goods, by placing them
at the disposal of the consignee in accordance with the contract or with law
or usage applicable at the port of discharge; or
(c) by handing over the goods to an authority or other third party to
63 Under the chairmanship of Prof. Erling Selvig of Oslo University, Chairman of the Norwegian
(or rather Scandinavian) delegation, the following members of the Working Group acted as the
Drafting Party: Argentina, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Nigeria, Norway, Spain, Tanzania, U. K.,
U.S.S.R., and the United States.
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whom, pursuant to law or regulations applicable at the port of discharge,
the goods must be handed over.
(iii) In the provisions of paragraphs (i) and (ii), reference to the carrier or
to the consignee shall mean, in addition to the carrier or the consignee,
the servants, the agents or other persons acting pursuant to the instructions, respectively, of the carrier or the consignee.
In the closing plenary sessions regarding the revised Article I(e) the
United States delegation attempted to have the words "or usage" in
subparagraph (ii)(b) deleted or at least bracketed on the ground that the
inclusion of such language could be productive of substantial litigation.
Usages applicable in particular ports of discharge could be difficult to
determine and establish leading to uncertainty in a revised text which was
intended to remove uncertainties, however, the majority view supported
the inclusion of the phrase without its being bracketed.
The United States repeated its concerns about "usage" at the Second
Reading of the text and it was then decided to rephrase the expression
slightly as, "usage of the particular trade." With this slight exception,
the language of the Third Session Report has been incorporated into
Article 4 of the 1975 Draft Convention.
In addition to its consideration of the period of carrier responsibility
the Working Group also considered a possible revision of Article VII of
the Hague Rules and a revision of the formula of Article 111(2). This
third session agreed to the elimination of Article VII completely and the
fourth session eventually determined that the statement of carrier duties
in Article 111(2) would no longer be necessary in view of the new
formulation of carrier defenses.
B. Responsibility for Deck Cargo and Live Animals
1. Deck Cargo
The definition of "goods" in Hague Rules art. I(c) excludes "live
animals and cargo which by the contract of carriage is stated as being
carried on deck and is so carried." Separate consideration was given to
(a) deck cargo, and (b) live animals of these pseudo-definitions which
operate as exclusions of carrier liability, in that bill of lading clauses
place the risks of carriage on the shipper.
The Secretariat Report (paras 42-66) discussed three problems that
have arisen as a result of the exclusion of deck cargo:
(1)Carriers might escape liability for losses or damage to deck cargoes
resulting from causes wholly unrelated to any special risks that might
exist in the carriage of such cargoes on deck;
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(2) Freight containers, which could be carried as safely on deck as
below deck, were not covered by the Rules when they were stated to be
carried on deck; and
(3) It was not clear whether cargoes stowed above the main deck but
within certain types of protective enclosures were "deck cargo" for
purposes of the Hague Rules' exclusion.
The Report suggested amendments to deal with these problems.
If it were decided to amend the Hague Rules to cover deck cargo, the
simplest amendment would be to omit this exception from Article I(c);
the relevant language would then read:
'Goods' includes goods, wares, merchandise and articles of every kind
whatsoever..."
A more complicated approach, which came from the United Kingdom reply to the questionnaire, would supplement the above amendment by the following addition to Article IV, a proposal which had
been made for the Brussels Protocol but was rejected there,
"In respect of cargo which by the contract of carriage is stated as being
carried on deck and is so carried, all risks of loss or damage arising or
resulting from perils inherent in or incident to such carriage shall be
borne by the shipper and the consignee but in other respects the custody
and carriage of such cargo shall be governed by the terms of this Convention."
The United States delegation took strong exception to the expression
"incident to such carriage" in the above formulation as a vague term
which might unduly expand carrier defenses.
In order to take account of the container revolution in ocean shipping
the Hague Rules could be amended in two possible ways, according to
the Secretariat Report.
Art. (c):-"'Goods' includes goods, wares, merchandise and articles of
every kind whatsoever except live animals and cargo (other
than freight containers) which by the contract of carriage is
stated as being carried on deck and is so carried." or
Art. (c):-"'Goods' includes goods, wares, merchandise and articles of
every kind whatsoever except live animals and cargo which by
the contract of carriage is stated as being carried on deck and is
so carried. However, 'goods' shall include all freight containers, whether carried on deck or below deck."
Furthermore, the Secretariat offered another proposal to handle the
problem of cargoes stowed above the main deck but under cover, as, for
example, in Shelter Deck vessels or the "C-3" type vessels launlched at
the end of the Second World War.
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"Cargo that is stowed above the main deck but within permanent
enclosures that provide for the cargo substantially the same security as if it
were stowed below deck shall not be considered to be "deck cargo' within
the meaning of this article."
These suggested drafts by the Secretariat took into account the fact
that replies to the Secretariat's questionnaire generally supported
removal of the exclusion for "deck cargo". Those of Brazil, Hungary,
Greece, India, Iraq, Nigeria, Norway and Sweden indicated that
removal of the exclusion be accomplished, while the reply of Korea
stated that the present rules on this topic need improvement, and the
replies of France and Austria suggested that "deck cargo" should be
brought within the Rules, but indicated that it should be possible to limit
responsibility by contract. The reply of the United Kingdom stated that,
with regard to deck cargo, "there is no reason why the shipowners should
not be subject to the Rules except for damage arising from the deck carriage itself". Poland appeared to 'favour removal of the exclusion but
cautioned that "cargo not resistant to atmospheric conditions ... would

not be duly protected". Replies supporting the continued exclusion of
"deck cargo" came from Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon ("as shipowners"),
Japan, Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
It should be noted at this point that 30 nations and four international
organizations responded to the Secretariat's questionnaire. 64
In that regard, the reply of the International Chamber of Shipping
stated,
"In certain trades general cargo, which would previously have been
carried under-deck, is now regularly carried on-deck in containers with the
contract of carriage subject to the Hague Rules.
In some countries such contractual arrangements do not have the
same legal effect as statute law. Accordingly there is scope for change
here. Shipowners would willingly participate in attempting to find a
form of words which widens the definition of cargo to include cargo
which although stowed on deck, is by agreement between the parties
carried on Hague Rules terms."
At the Plenary India and Tanzania urged the elimination of the
distinction between on deck and under deck cargo. This view was
supported by Argentina, with the comment that Argentine courts do not
exclude claims against the carrier for damage to on deck cargo. France
also urged strongly that all distinctions between on deck and under deck
cargo be eliminated. There was general agreement that the exception of
deck cargo was indefensible even though the freight rate charged for on
64The
questionnaire and replies are contained in Doe. No. A/CN.9/WG.llI/WP.4/Add.I
(Vols. I, II and III).
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deck shipment was usually less than for under deck shipments. There was
a consensus that the protective measures to be taken by the carrier might
necessarily differ in the case of on deck cargo from those undertaken
with respect to under deck, but that this different treatment could not
justify the absence of a duty of care on the part of the carrier and there
was no longer a need for the exclusion of deck cargo, especially in view of
the development of container vessels in which the container's position
might be shifted at different ports from being technically under deck to
technically on deck.
Japan noted that on deck cargo was more likely to be lost at sea
because it had less protection, and that the inclusion of deck cargo within
the new rules would necessitate either a higher freight rate or refusal to
carry deck cargo altogether.
The Soviet Union stated that the existing deck cargo exclusion was
unacceptable and that general principles of liability should apply.
The United States noted that while deck cargoes were excluded from
the coverage of the Hague Rules and the United States Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (hereinafter C.O.G.S.A.) such cargoes were within the
protection of the Harter Act which excluded only live animals from
coverage, 11 accordingly the United States could not support the
continued exclusion of deck cargoes. Furthermore, the United States
said that the on deck exclusion had aggravated problems of container
transportation generally and therefore proposed a series of amendments
to the Hague Rules to deal with both problems, as follows
"Article l(c)-Goods includes (goods), wares, merchandise and
articles of every kind whatsoever [except live animals.]."
Proposed new article-"Goods which are stored within freight containers shall be subject to these rules. A freight container is:
(a) of a permanent character and accordingly strong enough to be
suitable for repeated use;
(b) specially designed to facilitate the carriage of goods, by one or more
modes of transport, without intermediate reloading;
(c) fitted with devices permitting its ready handling; particularly its
transfer from one mode of transport to another;
(d) so designed as to be easy to fill and empty;
(e) having an internal volume of 1 m 3 (35.3 ft. 3) or more;

(f) the term freight container includes neither vehicles nor conventional
packing".
Proposed amendment to Article III, (7)-"Cargo for which a bill of
lading has been issued which bill of lading does not provide for on deck
stowage must be carried under deck. Failure to so carry will make the
carrier liable for all losses direct and indirect of on deck stowage."
Proposed amendment to Article IV--"In respect of cargo which by
46 U.S.C. 195 (1974).
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the contract of carriage is stated as being carried on deck and is so carried, all risks of loss or damage arising or resulting from perils inherent in such carriage shall be borne by the shipper and the consignee
but in other respects the custody and carriage of such cargo shall be
governed by the terms of this Convention."

It was the intention of these proposed amendments to clarify the
situation respecting cargoes deliberately intended by the consignor to be
shipped on deck and those cargoes intended
for under deck shipment but
66
which are actually carried on deck.
Norway immediately opposed the United States proposal as being too
complicated and indicated a belief that there should be no special
provisions for on deck liability, the general rules being sufficient for that
purpose. This Norwegian view was supported by Spain, Australia,
Argentina, and Egypt. Subsequently, however, Norway introduced a
proposed new article on deck carriage, as follows
66

Since deck cargo is not within the terms of COGSA the preexisting case law continues. There

are, however, two separate types of problems:
(1) Cargo deliberately shipped on deck.
(2) Cargo designated for underdeck shipment which is actually shipped on deck.
Knauth has said that the exception of deck cargo was intended to protect the Baltic timber trade
(A. Knauth, "Ocean Bills of Lading, 236 4th ed. [1953]). Prior to the recent development of the
containership the carriage of live animals was not an important part of American foreign trade
although timber cargoes were. The 1893 Harter Act specifically excepted live animals from its
coverage 46 USC 196, whereas there is no exclusion of deck cargo from the coverage of the Harter
Act. Thus, an exculpatory clause in a bill of lading will not relieve the carrier-time charterer of
liability for negligence, since COGSA does not supersede Harter even as to the "tackle to tackle"
period for deck cargoes. Blanchard Lumber Co. v. S.S. Anthony II, 259 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.
1967)
(1) Cargo deliberately shipped on deck
There is a presumption that cargo paying full freight and shipped under a clean bill of lading
must be stowed under deck unless there is an express written agreement to the contrary or unless
there is clear evidence of contrary custom. See The Sarnia,278 Fed. 459 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied 258
US 625 (1921). Although cargo deliberately shipped on deck is not covered by COGSA it is possible
that COGSA terms could apply when the goods are shipped under a bill of lading which
incorporates the provisions of COGSA by reference, in which case the carrier will be liable for
failure to take proper precautions to care for the cargo. See Diethelm & Co. Ltd. v. S.S. Flying
Trader 141 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd. 244 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1957).
(2) Cargo designatedfor underdeck shipment which is actually shipped on deck.
Because of the presumption of underdeck storage the carrier has been held to a strict liability for
damage to cargo stowed on deck after a clean (or "under deck") bill of lading has been issued and
full freight has been paid. See The Delaware 81 US 579 (1871). This strict liability has been
enforced, as against bill of lading clauses and provisions in both the Harter Act and COGSA, by the
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Add to Article III, (7)
"If the goods have been stowed on deck, a statement to that effect shall
be inserted in the bill of lading unless deck stowage is in accordance with
usage or statutory requirements. In cases of non-compliance with the
preceding provision, the bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of
stowage under deck. However, proof to the contrary shall not be
admissable when the bill of lading had been transferred to a third party
acting in good faith."
Thereafter, a further draft proposal was offered by Norway on this subject,
"1. The carrier shall be entitled to carry the goods on deck only if such
carriage is in accordance with an agreement with the shipper, with usage
or with statutory requirements.
2. If the carrier and the shipper have agreed that the goods shall or may be
carried on deck, the carrier, shall insert in the bill of lading a statement to
that effect. In the absence of such a statement the carrier shall have the
burden of proving that an agreement for carriage on deck has been entered
into. However, the carrier shall not be entitled to invoke such an
agreement against a third party who has acquired the bill of lading in good
faith.
3. Where the goods have been carried on deck contrary to the provisions of
paragraph 1, the carrier shall be liable for loss of or damage to the goods
which result solely from the carriage on deck in accordance with the
provisions of [Article 4, paragraph 5 as amended by the 1968 Additional
concept that on deck storage of cargo shipped under a clean bill of lading is a deviation which ousts
the contract of carriage and restores the parties to the bailment relationship with strict liability of the
bailee, the carrier. Thus, in St. Johns N. F. Shipping Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral, 263 U.S. 119
(1923), decided under the Harter Act, the bill of lading clauses limiting cargo's recovery and
exculpating the shipowner from liability were voided because the contract of affreightment itself had
been ousted by the deviation. At the present time there is a conflict between the circuit courts
whether the COGSA language condemning unreasonable deviations (COGSA 1304 (4); H.R. IV
(4)) means that the contract of affreightment itself is not ousted by the deviation. In AtlanticMutual
Ins. Co. v. Poseidon Schiffahrt, G.M.B.H. 313 F.2d 872 (7th Cir.)cert. denied, 375 U.S. 819 (1963),
the court held that the carrier would be protected by the $500 Package Limitation of COGSA 1304
(5) even in cases of unreasonable deviation. However, in Encyclopaedia Britannica v. S.S. Hong
Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied 397 U.S. 964 (1970), the court found that the
issuance of a clean bill of lading (which did not provide liberty to stow on deck or under deck) would
require the carrier to pay full damages without the benefit of the COGSA $500 Package Limitation
or bill of lading clauses by reason of the unreasonable deviation of on deck stowage of cargo. See
also Searoad Shipping Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 361 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.) cert. denied
385 U.S. 973 (1966); Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y., 1953).
Deviation in American law concerns geographical distances as well as the methods of carriage;
nevertheless the recent decisions have exonerated the carrier on the grounds of reasonable
geographical deviation while holding the carrier liable for on-deck stowage and dry-docking with
cargo onboard. See Haroco Co., Inc. v. The TaiShan, I ll F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) aff'd 218
F. 2d 822 (2d Cir. 1955); Kroll v. Silver Line, Ltd., 116 F. Supp. 443 (N.D.Cal. 1953); Accinanto
Ltd. v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 99 F. Supp. 261 (D. Md. 1951) affd 199 F. 2d 134 (4th Cir.
1952); American Cyanamid v. Booth SS Co., 99 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) aff'd F. 2d 529 (2nd
Cir. 1952). See also American Metal Co. v. M/V Belleville, 284 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Protocol]. The same shall apply when the carrier in accordance with
paragraph 2 of this Article is not entitled to invoke an agreement for
carriage on deck."
Poland also introduced a draft proposal respecting deck cargo,
"Goods" include goods, wares, merchandise and articles of every kind
whatsoever, except cargo carried on deck. However, "goods" shall include
cargo carried on deck, if:
a) they are so carried without the shipper's consent;
b) they are carried in all freight containers;
c) they are stowed above the main deck but within permanent enclosures
that provide for the cargo substantially the same security as if they were
stowed below deck.
In the event, it is proved that loss of, or damage to deck cargo, results
exclusively from unseaworthiness of the ship, or from a fault made by the
carrier recklessly, such deck cargo shall be considered to be "goods"
within the meaning of this Article.
Cargo carried on board "container-ships" are always considered as
"goods", whether stowed on or below deck.
After a lengthy and difficult discussion in the Plenary and the Drafting
Party it proved to be impossible to achieve consensus on any basis other
than a removal of the exclusion of deck cargo from the scope of coverage
of the Hague Rules. The Drafting Party definition was accepted by the
Plenary, as follows
"Goods" includes goods, wares, merchandise and articles of every kind
whatsoever [except live animals]."
There was another division of opinion regarding the possible addition
to Article IV proposed initially by the United Kingdom to place upon the
shipper all risks of loss or damage arising or resulting from perils
inherent in or incident to carriage on deck, or to relieve the carrier from
liability for all losses connected with the special risks of on deck carriage.
A decision on this question was postponed for a later session, however
the following suggestions were made by various members of the Drafting

Party:
(a) That the words "incident to" be deleted from the text;
(b) That the phrase "which by the contract of carriage is stated as
being... and is so carried" be deleted, so that the clause would read as
follows: "In respect of cargo carried on deck", etc.;
(c) That the provision be modelled upon article 17, paragraph 4, of the
Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by
Road (CMR) done at Geneva on 19 May 1956. This Convention states in
part: " . . . The carrier shall be relieved of liability when the loss or
damage arises from the special risks inherent in one or more of the
following circumstances:
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(a) Use of open unsheeted vehicles, when their use has been expressly
agreed and specified in the consignment note;... ".
In view of the decision to eliminate the exclusion of deck cargo it
would not be necessary to provide for an exact description of the places
onboard ship where cargo would be considered under deck.
While there was no consensus on the general regime of liability for
damage to cargo carried on deck either deliberately or inadvertently,
against the directions of the consignor, the Drafting Party and the
Plenary Session separated the proposals on deck and container cargoes
into a group of proposals for which there was almost a consensus in favor
and a group of proposals for which there was not yet a consensus in
opposition. Thus, the group of proposals for which considerable support
had been received were stated as agreed principles for a future session:
(a) The carrier shall be entitled to carry the goods on deck only if such
carriage is in accordance with an agreement with the shipper, or with
statutory requirements, and possibly with usage.
(b) Any agreement between the carrier and the shipper to the effect that
the goods can or may be carried on deck must be reflected in a statement
in the bill of lading.
(c) If the bill of lading does not contain the statement referred to in
paragraph (b) above, it shall be presumed that the carrier and shipper have
not entered into such an agreement, but as against the shipper, the carrier
shall be entitled to prove and invoke the true agreement.
Some delegates stated that these principles would be required only if
provisions containing special rules regarding the carrier's responsibility
for deck cargo should be included in the Hague Rules.
The group of proposals against which opposition was recorded were
the following principles to be given further consideration:
(d) If an agreement with the shipper that cargo shall be carried on deck
is not reflected in the bill of lading, then the carrier shall not be entitled to
invoke such agreement against a consignee who has acquired the bill of
lading in good faith.
(e) If goods are carried on deck in breach of the principles referred to in
paragraph (a) above, then the carrier shall be liable for all losses direct and
indirect of on-deck storage.
The United States warned that the many problems for shippers
associated with the exclusion of deck cargo from the Hague Rules would
not be solved simply by the elimination of the exclusion, and that the
container revolution had not been so complete that developing countries
might not in the future have problems with cargoes intended for under
deck shipment but actually carried on deck. While the solution in the
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United States gave the cargo owner a drastic and possibly illogical
remedy, in that the bill of lading itself was ousted and the carrier became
an insurer, nevertheless it was believed that the new Hague Rules
should contain some serious penalization of the carrier who deliberately
or inadvertently carries under deck cargo on deck.
Reconsideration of these issues took place during the sixth session
of the Working Group and during the Second Reading. This proved to
be a very contentious issue and it may provoke further debate at the
UNCITRAL Plenary or the Diplomatic Conference. At the present
time the provisions of the Draft Convention respecting deck cargo are
to be found in Article 9.
2. Live Animals

The proposal offered by the Secretariat for the removal of the
exclusion of live animals from the Hague Rules was based on replies to
the questionnaire from Brazil, India, and Iraq. France and Austria had
suggested that "live animals" should be brought within the Hague Rules,
but indicated that it should be possible to limit responsibility by contract.
Japan had stated that it is a "considerable risk, almost tantamount to
gambling, to undertake the carriage of live animals, while ensuring their
life or health" (except "in the trade of sheep on a large scale, where a
certain mortality rate is agreed upon... "). Removal of this exclusion
was further opposed in the replies of Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon ("as
shipowners"), Denmark, Greece, Norway, Philippines, Poland, ("the
problem of carrying live animals calls for a separate and detailed
regulation"), Saudi Arabia and Sweden.
Nevertheless, the discussion in the Plenary Session reflected uncertainties as to the extent of carriage of live animals and the carrier's duties
and exemptions from liability. India clearly supported the removal of the
live animal exclusion. Egypt noted that in draft legislation the carrier
would be responsible for normal care of animals while the shipper's
representative would be responsible for special care, the type of division
of risks in the European Road and Rail Conventions.
Thus a provision might be modeled on Article 27(3) of the CIM
Convention (The International Convention Concerning Carriage of
Goods by Rail) which provides,
"3. ... the railway shall be relieved of liability when the loss or damage
arises out of the special risks inherent in one or more of the following

circumstances:
(g) the carriage of livestock"

October 1975

Hague Rules

93

or Article 17(4) of the CMR Convention (The International Convention
Concerning Carriage of Goods by Road) which provides,
"... .the carrier shall be relieved of liability when the loss or damage arises
from the special risks inherent in one or more of the following
circumstances:
(f) the carriage of livestock".
The United States noted that live animals were excluded from the 1893
Harter Act because of the peculiar risks to both carrier and shipper. 67
There were several United States shipping companies engaged in the
movement of live animals on specially designed vessels; for example, one
company offered a "cow-tainer" service from Southern United States
ports to Latin America. There had not been a demand from United
States shippers for the removal of the exclusion, but one government
department, the Department of Agriculture, was greatly concerned with
humane and healthful conditions in the shipment of live animals, and the
United States could support an international duty on the part of all states
to draw up regulations to prevent inhumane and unhealthy transportation of live animals. India noted its support for such a proposal.
Poland offered a proposal that live animals, whether carried on deck
or below deck, should be considered as goods if it is proved that damage
or loss was sustained exclusively because of the unseaworthiness of the
vessel or reckless faults of the carrier.
Concern was expressed that a removal of the exclusion alone would
not properly resolve problems- associated with the carriage of live
animals. The carrier would not have an adequate defense against
ordinary risks simply in the "inherent vice of the cargo" exception.
Nevertheless, most speakers did not regard live animal carriage as an
important problem.
Because there was no consensus on the resolution of the live animal
problem, it was deferred for future consideration, at which point the
UNIDROIT observer, whose organization was anxious to have a
function in the remaking of international maritime law, suggested that if
UNCITRAL would request UNIDROIT to undertake a study of live
animal carriage, it would be done. The UNIDROIT study on live
animals was considered at the Sixth Session of this Working Group and
the approved language is in Article 5(5) of the Draft Convention.
C. JurisdictionalProvisions: The Problem of "In Rem"
The most controversial and difficult portion of the third session, from
the United States' viewpoint, concerned the proposal for international
6746 U.S.C. 195 (1974).
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legislation on the subject of jurisdiction in cargo damage disputes. This
subject matter is not directly regulated in the Hague Rules, and an
extensive practice has grown up over the years for the question of
jurisdiction of courts (and arbitration) to be determined by a clause in
the printed form bill of lading. The enforceability of these clauses in the
United States is very controversial. 68 The principal argument against
their validity is that the jurisdiction clause has the effect of "lessening the
carrier's liability" and is therefore null and void. " It was the fear of the
United States delegation that any international legislation on the subject
could only restrict the cargo owner's rights, and that very delicate
compromises would have to be achieved in order for the new rules to
become acceptable to cargo-owning nations. Another factor adding to
the difficult nature of this drafting task was the vast procedural and
conceptual differences among the groups of member states respecting the
bases for the exercise of jurisdiction over defendants.
68A 1955 decision of the Second Circuit of the Court of Appeals had dismissed, as against the
presumed validity of the jurisdictional clause, an argument based on COGSA 1303 (8) infra and
held that jurisdictional clauses would be valid unless the shipper proves the clause unreasonable.
Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line, 224 F.2d 806 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied 350 U.S. 903
(1955). This decision was in line with that court's earlier decision in Kloeckner Reederei und
Kohlenhandel G.M.B.H. v. A/S Hakedal, 210 F.2d 754 (2nd Cir. 1954) cert. dismissed, 348 U.S.
801 (1955) discounting the argument that the possibility of different and unfavorable results in
another forum should influence the decision of an American court on a motion to dismiss for forum
non conveniens reasons where both parties were foreign. Subsequently the Fifth Circuit took an
approach to jurisdiction which conflicted with that of the Second Circuit in Muller and Kloeckner.
In Motor Distributors,Ltd. v. Olaf Pedersen'sRederiA /S,239 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1956) cert. denied,
353 U.S. 938 (1957) the court held that the carrier must prove extreme prejudice in order to obtain
dismissal of the complaint because of public policy against agreements to oust the jurisdiction of the
court in advance of controversy. An attempt to obtain Supreme Court review of the conflict between
the circuits was unsuccessful in Carbon Black Export Co. v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. dismissed 359 U.S. 180 (1959) reh. denied, 359 U.S. 999 because the Supreme Court
considered that it did not have to reach the validity of the jurisdictional clause in a case begun by in
rem process against the ship since by the terms of the particular jurisdiction clause the ouster of
plaintiff's choice of jurisdiction would occur only in in personam suits. Now, however, the Second
Circuit has reconsidered its 1955 decision and has specifically overruled it in the case of Indussa
Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F. 2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1967) wherein the court held that the jurisdictional
clause in question had the effect of lessening the carrier's liability in accordance with COGSA 1303
(8) and was thereby rendered invalid. (For a general discussion of the earlier aspects of the problem,
see A. Yiannopoulos, Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills of Lading, 110-22 (1962).)
69 Opinion concerning jurisdiction clauses in bills of lading is sharply divided in the worldwide
shipping industry. It is obvious that the Hague Rules contain no provisions explicitly regulating such
clauses; however, there is an implicit prohibition in 46 U.S.C. 1303 (8), Article III (8)
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship
from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods, arising from negligence,
fault or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this section, or lessening such liability
otherwise than as provided in this chapter shall be null and void and of no effect ..."
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The Secretariat Report offered four basic approaches:
(I) No provision on jurisdiction, in accordance with the existing Hague
Rules:
(2) A provision prohibiting all forum selection clauses;
(3) A provision prohibiting those forum selection clauses which evidence
abuse of economic power or the use of unfair means;
(4) A provision on jurisdiction following the examples of other international transport conventions, especially the Warsaw Convention, 70 the
road and rail conventions, 71 and the Passenger Luggage Convention. 72
In realizing the fourth alternative, the Secretariat had prepared Draft
Proposal A, as follows:
A. In a legal proceeding arising out of the contract of carriage the
plaintiff, at its option, may bring an action.
1. In a state within whose territory is situated:
(a) the principal place of business of the carrier or the carrier's
branch or agency through which the contract of carriage was
made; or
(b) the domicile or permanent place of residence of the plaintiff if
the defendant has a place of business in that State; or
(c) the place where the goods were delivered to the carrier; or
(d) the place designated for delivery to the consignee; or
2. In a contracting state or place designated in the contract of
carriage.
B. No legal proceedings arising out of the contract of carriage may be
brought in a place not specified in paragraph A above.
C. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs A and B above, an
agreement made by the parties after a claim under the contract of
carriage has arisen, which designates the place where the claimant may
bring an action, shall be effective.
Although there were slight differences, a substantial number of
delegates were in favor of a jurisdictional statement along the lines of
Draft Proposal A: United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Chile, Egypt,
Japan, Nigeria, Ghana, Norway, Belgium and the Soviet Union.
70 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by

Air, Oct. 12, 1929.49 Stat. 3000; T.S. 876; 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
71The European Road Convention (C.M.R.) is the Convention on the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Road, May 19, 1956.
The European Rail Convention (C.I.M.) is the Convention on the Transport of Goods by Rail,
Berne, Feb. 25, 1961.
7' Draft International Convention Respecting Carriage of Passengers and their Accompanied
Baggage. I J. Marit. L. & Comm. 513, 523 (1970).
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The United States, Australia and Argentina expressed considerable
reservations about Draft Proposal A, but this opposition could not
overcome the strong support which the Secretariat Draft had attracted.
Australia objected that they had had considerable trouble with
jurisdictional clauses respecting inbound shipments, but that today no
bill of lading clause could oust the jurisdiction of Australian courts, nor
would the Australian courts recognize the ouster by bill of lading clause
of the jurisdiction of a court at the place of shipment or delivery. (The
Australian C.O.G.S.A. is applicable by its terms to all outward
shipments.) Australia would insist that if there were to be any
international legislation, the minimum right of the cargo owner must be
the right to sue the carrier at the place of delivery and the place of
shipment.
The United States objected that the criteria selected for jurisdiction of
cargo disputes were insufficient and that the omission of a provision for
some sort of In Rem jurisdiction 71 was a fatal defect which would create
great difficulties for the United States and render any eventual adherence
to the new convention very uncertain because paragraph B of Draft
Proposal A would forbid the commencement of legal proceedings in any
place not specified in paragraph A which did not include the place of
arrest of the offending vessel. Thus the choice for the United States
would be at best a reservation to the jurisdictional portion of the
convention or at worst a failure to ratify. Although the In Rem
jurisdiction might be regarded as an historical anachronism, nevertheless, there was a strong public policy in favor of its retention in the
United States, especially in cargo damage cases because such a small
portion of United States foreign trade by volume (about 5%) was carried
in United States flag vessels.
Argentina supported the United States position that jurisdiction,
based on an embargo or seizure of the vessel (In Rem Process) should be
preserved. Argentine courts had held jurisdictional clauses in bills of
lading to be null and void, thus Argentina had many reservations about
Draft Proposal A and therefore offered the suggestion that the jurisdiction provisions of the Convention might be placed in a separate protocol
which states ratifying or adhereing to the Convention might accept or
reject. The United States responded to the Argentine suggestion that the
73

Torts or contracts caused by the vessel herself or the Master and crew serving in her give rise
to a claim against the vessel supported by a property right in the vessel herself created, not by the
parties but by operation of law. This property right, the maritime lien, determines the right of the
maritime claimant to bring his action against the offending thing, In Rem. See Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. City of Athens, 83 F. Supp. 67 (D. Md., 1949).
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problem with protocols of jurisdiction was that what was essentially a
private dispute would quickly- become an international dispute.
During the subsequent debate the United States proposed to add
language to Draft Proposal A so as to preserve the jurisdiction of courts
at the place where the vessel upon which the goods were shipped when
damaged, was found, and an amendment to Draft Proposal A to
provide jurisdiction wherever the carrier was doing business. Ghana,
Nigeria, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina indicated that they could support
the addition of In Rem jurisdiction to the Draft Proposal.
With respect to Draft Proposal A itself, Hungary favored the proposal
generally, but felt that the expression "place" of business or residence
was inexact, favoring reference only to "contracting states." Others,
however, pointed out the dangers to the entire convention during a
delayed ratification process.
Objections to subparagraph l(b), the plaintiff's domicile or residence,
were made by Japan, United Kingdom, Norway, Belgium and France for
varied reasons. The United Kingdom preferred the present situation in
the Hague Rules but was prepared to accept Draft Proposal A as a
compromise which would legislate jurisdiction of claims, although the
most important goal must be the prevention of forum shopping, which
meant that the United Kingdom could not support subparagraph 1(b).
Norway felt that 1(b) was objectionable because the forum might have
little or nothing to do with the specific transaction, and therefore a lack
of cost effectiveness would dictate the omission of such a provision.
Norway objected to any In Rem attachment at places other than the
states listed in subparagraphs l(a), (c), and (d), and Norway further
argued that provisions for jurisdiction in many places, through the use of
an outmoded procedural device, while appropriate in the consumer
context of aviation passenger injuries, would not be appropriate in the
commercial context of cargo claims.
The Soviet Union preferred Draft Proposal B74 rather than Draft
Proposal A, which was the choice of most delegations because in land
and air transport the carrier normally had permanent representatives at
places of loading and discharging cargo, but the ocean carrier (especially
the tramp steamer on charter hire) did not have permanent representatives at all ports of call. It was for this reason that the parties must be
free to make suitable provisions among themselves respecting the
jurisdiction of disputes. Furthermore, the essential goal of an international agreement would be the ability of the parties to agree to arbitrate
disputes which was the customary method for the resolution of
74 Draft Proposal B provides that the claimant's choice of forum is limited only if he and the
other contracting party have agreed to the limitation of fora as prescribed in the Convention.
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commercial disputes 75among the states of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance.
France preferred Draft Proposal A because of its assimilation to the
existing rail, road, and air transport conventions. At first France believed
the In Rem problem to be solved by the 1952 C.M.I. Convention on the
Arrest of Vessels 76; however, in view of the small number of states
parties to that convention, it would not be an acceptable resolution of the
In Rem problem, which, in any event, presented an unacceptable
theoretical basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. Spain concurred in the
French opposition to the In Rem process as the creation of a purely
accidehtal forum without sufficient contacts to the transaction.
There followed a heated debate on the nature of In Rem jurisdiction.
The British practice whereby the arrest of the vessel is used to compel
personal jurisdiction over the shipowner 77 was compared to the American practice, which establishes the jurisdiction of the court even in the
absence of personal jurisdiction over the shipowner.7 8 The United States
believed that there was a great need for a study of the In Rem process
because in many states which do not formally recognize it, the same
effect can be obtained through other means. However, there was no
support for this proposal.
During the course of the debate in the Drafting Party, it became
apparent that some modifications of the traditional In Rem process
would be necessary in order to preserve it. Thus the United States had at
first proposed the addition of the place of In Rem jurisdiction to the list
of available jurisdictions in Draft Proposal A. In the face of considerable
opposition to this, the United States proposed to permit the defendant to
force plaintiff to remove the action to one of the other jurisdictional sites
by providing adequate security, with the decision on the adequacy or
sufficiency of ihe security to be made' by the transferee court. There was
no demand for the removal state to determine adequacy. This was
75 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), once known as COMECON, with
headquarters in Moscow, is responsible for improving conditions of trade among the centrally
planned economies of Eastern Europe. Arbitration has proven to be the most effective means of
dispute resolution in those countries. The C.M.E.A. statute is in 368 U.N.T.S. 264.
76 See fn. 45, supra.
7 C. Price, The Law of Maritime Liens (1940). The historical development of the newer British
concept of In Rem Attachment as a method of compelling personal jurisdiction is traced from the
downfall of the historic Admiralty Court's Doctors' Commons to the absorption of Admiralty by
common law trained lawyers in F. Wiswall, Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice
since the Eighteenth Century (1970).
71 The United States theory of personification of the vessel thereby justifying the conferral of
jurisdiction by reason of the arrest of the vessel is given a clear exposition in 0. Holmes, The
Common Law 25 et seq. (1881), although the historical explanation therein may be erroneous. Cf.
the Holmes opinion in The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922).
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changed so that the transferor state would finally determine adequacy of
security. These changes produced some additional support, and the
United States then made a further amendment that this new In Rem
remedy would be available only where the vessel could be properly
attached in accordance with the local law.
The United States recognized that these concessions on the traditional
In Rem process represented a major departure from existing law in the
United States and might cause some delay in the ratification process,
especially in view of recent reaffirmations of the necessity for it. 79 The
absence of this kind of jurisdiction in air and rail conventions was
irrelevant in view of the nature of the permanent installations for rail
transportation and the bilateral agreements and guarantees supporting
air transport. The United States believed that its proposal on In Rem
process should not be further refined by distinguishing the liner service
with permanent port installations from the tramp steamer.
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union remained strongly
opposed to the compromise In Rem jurisdiction.
Ghana disapproved both the United States proposal and the language
of paragraph B of Draft Proposal A, and would solve the In Rem
problem by removal of the prohibition of legal proceedings otherwise
than provided for in the jurisdiction article of the convention. The United
Kingdom felt the United States compromise would create an itinerant
forum and would derogate from the 1952 Arrest of Ships Convention,
which had obtained 26 ratifications or adhesions and that any In Rem
process must remain purely provisional and protective, not
jurisdictional.8 0 Finally, Norway urged that paragraph B was essential,
but that Norway could support the United States proposal as a
jurisdiction of last resort when there were no other means to enforce a
claim.
The compromise solution to the In Rem process was approved by a
majority of the Working Group, although there were some dissents to it.
There were no changes at the Second Reading of the text, and the text in
Article 21 of the Draft Convention was not placed in brackets.
It should be clearly noted that the language of Paragraph 2 of Article
21 is a basis for jurisdiction conferred by the general maritime law, and
" The 1966 merger of the Admiralty side of the federal courts into the civil side reexamined the
question of retaining the peculiar Admiralty remedies found in the old Supreme Court Admiralty
Rules. The Admiralty remedies, including In Rem process are now found in Rule C, Supplemental
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Preservation of the traditional Admiralty practice possibly accounts for the lack of success, after
years of effort, in codifying the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts and the procedures
respecting state owned vessels in commercial service.
80 See fn. 77 and 78 supra.
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as such is not concerned with merely provisional protective measures
against absconding defendants which are recognized by all legal
systems8 1 and are preserved in the second sentence of Paragraph 3 of
Article 21. It is believed that Paragraph 2 is the product of comparative
law analysis and refinement which is not an adoption of the views of any
single delegation. There is no question that Paragraph 2 will present
conceptual difficulties for continental legal scholars. Also, there is no
question that the transfer provisions upon posting of security represents a
great change in United States law. If this provision should not be
adopted, it would then be necessary for the United States to reconsider
its position with respect to a reservation to the entire Article 21 on
jurisdiction.
An issue which received slight consideration before its adoption was
the provisions of the 1952 Brussels Convention on Civil Jurisdiction in
matters of collision8 2 respecting the effect of an initial proceeding in one
forum on a subsequent attempt to bring the same action in another
forum (Lis Alibi Pendens).8 3 There was some discussion of the problem
in federal states, as in the United States, Canada and Mexico, where
there are federal and local (state or provincial) courts operating in the
same territory. Also the United States expressed concern that the
reasons for commencement of a second suit, such as the lack of assets at
the situs of the first suit, should be spelled out. The Plenary Session of
the Working Group had referred Draft Proposal A to the Drafting Party,
where many of the arguments previously made against it were made
again. The Drafting Party then took Draft Proposal A as a foundation
and attempted additions and modifications from other conventions. The
resulting text eliminated the proposal of subparagraph 1(b) respecting
the plaintiff's domicile or residence, and further modified the choice of
the place of contracting by the qualifying provision that the defendant
must have a place of business where the exact bill of lading was prepared.
The provision respecting jurisdiction at places designated in the
contract 8 4 was strongly opposed by the United States, Argentina, and
Spain.
The United States also opposed the use of the word "plaintiff" as
inappropriate in the context of the purpose for which these rules were
8'An example of attachment to protect the status quo in a dispute may be found in Article(s) 75
and 76 of the new Soviet Merchant Shipping Code, (W. Butler & J. Quigley transl. 1970).
82 International Convention on Certain Rules Concerning Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision, May 10, .1952, N. Singh at 1131 (1963). See Article 1 (3).
11 Lis Alibi Pendens is a discretionary doctrine which would justify a court in declining to exercise
jurisdiction where the parties are litigating the same issues in another court. See The Kaiser Wilhelm
Der Grosse, 175 Fed. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) Cf. Petition of Bloomfield Steamship Co., 422 F.2d 728
(2d Cir. 1970).
84 See fn. 68, supra.

October 1975

Hague Rules

101

being drafted. "Plaintiff" would mean either the cargo interest or the
carrier interest, whereas the true purpose of the provision was to replace
choice of law and choice of forum clauses in bills of lading limiting the
effective remedies for the cargo interest. The cargo interest might be
considerably disadvantaged as to forum selection by the action of carrier
interest in forestalling cargo claims by commencing actions for the
payment of additional charges (for example, charges for demurrage,
general average and lighterage are not included in the freight charge and
can be enforced against the cargo itself8 5 ) even though the carrier interest
has not had difficulty with enforcement of its rights under local law or by
reason of control over the goods themselves.
An issue which remains for consideration by the Diplomatic Conference is the limitation of the choice of forum to contracting states. This
may be much too narrow and may even have a multiplier effect in
delaying ratifications by those states which would insist on the maximum
number of available remedies for cargo claimants. This is the jurisdiction provision, adopted at the third session and now incorporated in
Article 21 of the Draft Convention,
1. In a legal proceeding arising out of the contract of carriage the
plaintiff, at his option, may bring an action in a contracting State within
whose territory is situated:
(a) The principal place of business or, in the absence thereof, the
ordinary residence of the defendant; or
(b) The place where the contract was made provided that the defendant
has there a place of business, branch or agency through which the contract
was made; or
(c) The port of loading; or
(d) The port of discharge; or
(e) A place designated in the contract of carriage.
2. (a) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this article, an action
may be brought before the courts of any port in a contracting State at
which the carrying vessel may have been legally arrested in accordance
with the applicable law of that State. However, in such a case, at the
petition of the defendant, the claimant must remove the action, at his
choice, to one of the jurisdictions referred to in paragraph I of this article
for the determination of the claim, but before such rehmoval the defendant
must furnish security sufficient to ensure payment of any judgement that
may subsequently be awarded to the claimant in the action;
(b) All questions relating to the sufficiency or otherwise of the security
shall be determined by the court at the place of the arrest.
3. No legal proceedings arising out of the contract of carriage may be
brought in a place not specified in paragraphs I and 2 or this article. The
85

See Yone Suzuki v. Central Argentine Ry., 27 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied 278 U.S.
652 (1929).
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provisions which precede do not constitute an obstacle to the jurisdiction
of the contracting States for provisional or protective measures.
4. (a) Where an action has been brought before a court competent under
paragraphs I and 2 of this article or where judgement has been delivered
by such a court, no new action shall be started between the same parties on
the same grounds unless the judgement of the court before which the first
action was brought is not enforceable in the country in which the new
proceedings are brought;
(b) For the purpose of this article the institution of measures with a view
to obtaining enforcement of a judgement shall not be considered as the
starting of a new action;
(c) For the purpose of this article the removal of an action to a different
court within the same country shall not be considered as the starting of a
new action.
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, an
agreement made by the parties after a claim under the contract of carriage
has arisen, which designates the place where the claimant may bring an
action, shall be effective.
At the conclusion of the third session, preliminary consideration was
given to the problem of arbitration clauses, but final decisions were not
taken until the fourth session when that subject was considered
independently.
D. Liability of the Carrier: The Fault Principle Preserved and the
CarrierDefenses Reformulated
At its February 1972 session one morning had been devoted to a
preliminary consideration of the basic rules governing responsibility of
the carrier. Alternative schemes of liability to replace the existing
Articles III and IV of the Hague Rules, as suggested in the Secretary
General's Report (Pars. 150-269 of "Responsibility of Ocean Carriers
for cargo: bills of lading" A/CN.9/63/Add.1), were considered. There
was no support for an absolute liability where the risk allocation would
8 6
be in favor of the shipper and against the carrier.
Both carrier nations and shipper nations supported the principle of
carrier liability based on fault, and it was believed to be desirable, at the
outset, that the basic principle of fault be simply stated while the rules for
the burden of proof be separately elaborated together with a separate
consideration of the exceptions to liability.
Proposals asked complete harmonization with other international
conventions on carriage of goods such as the Warsaw Convention, the
86

Report of the Third Session, A/CN.9/63.
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European
(CIM),
and the
European Convention
Convention on
on Transport
Transport ofofGoods
GoodsbybyRail
Road
(CMR).
Although there was support for harmonizing the different international
transport conventions to the greatest extent practicable, most delegations expressed the view that ocean transport was sufficiently different in
nature, being subject to vastly different risks than other forms of
transport, so as to make full harmonization impossible.
A third approach was to consider the modification of specific
substantive provisions of the Hague Rules, especially the policy based
defenses such as Article IV (2) (a), negligent navigation or management
of the ship and Article IV (2) (b), the exception for fire, coupled with
changes in the rules regarding burden of proof. The United States
delegation supported this approach at the outset and set forth proposals
in accordance with the positions contained in the United States
memorandum. The United Kingdom delegation advanced a somewhat
similar position. It stressed principally, however, the undesirability of
taking any action which could have the effect of increasing shippers'
costs. This same point was raised by the observer representatives from
the IUMI, ICS and ICC.
A fourth approach was the more drastic reformation of the Hague
Rules set forth in paragraph 269 of the Secretariat Report. This proposal
would replace Article IV (1) and (2) of the Hague Rules with a simple
statement that neither the carrier nor the shipowner is responsible for
loss or damage "arising without the actual fault or privity of the carrier,
or without the fault or neglect of the servants or the agents of the
carrier." A second paragraph would place the burden of proof on the
carrier to establish that neither his fault or privity nor the fault or neglect
of his agents or servants cause, concurred in, or contributed to the loss or
damage." This proposal was supported by a majority of the delegations.
Practically all of the developing countries supported paragraph 269 as
did also Australia, Norway, Spain, and Hungary.
France proposed a stricter version of the paragraph 269 draft whereby
the carrier would be fully responsible for the arrival of the goods in a
satisfactory state unless the carrier proved a fault on the part of the
shipper, some defect in the goods or a case of force majeure. For this
purpose force majeure would consist in an unforeseeable fact, force or
event irresistible and external to the carrier or his agent. The French
proposal would not have required separate provisions respecting burden
of proof, since the burden of proving non-liability always was on the
carrier.
In the fourth session in September, 1972, there were lengthy discus-
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sions in the Plenary Session and the Drafting Party, attempting to state
the basic principle of carrier liability separately from the exceptions or
the burden of proof rules, but this proved to be an impossible task.
The debate on the fault principle of liability quickly turned into a
discussion of the merits of preserving the two policy-based exceptions to
fault liability in the existing Hague Rules: Errors of navigation and
management of the vessel (H.R.IV 2 (a)) and Fire (H.R.IV 2 (b)).
The United Kingdom opposed any changes to the existing Hague
Rules because changes would increase costs in view of greater concentration of risks on the carrier. Shipper and shipowner groups in the United
Kingdom believed that increases of 1-2% in freight rates would
inevitably follow any change in the liability scheme, and such a proposed
change would destroy the ancient institutions of salvage and general
average since carriers would be less likely to give guarantees for cargo to
salvors and the concept of joint venture underlying general average
would be nullified if the cargo did not bear some of the risks of
navigation. The United Kingdom indicated that the exception for
negligent management might be removed in the interest of eliminating
friction, although the navigational error and fire exceptions must be
retained.
Norway cited statistics solicited from Norwegian P & I clubs showing
that the removal of the navigational error and fire exceptions would
result in the absorption by liability insurers (i.e.: P & I clubs) of double
the amount now being paid on cargo claims; accordingly, further study
of the economic factors might be appropriate before any change in the
risk allocation scheme. Nevertheless, Norway supported deletion of the
navigation and management error and fire exceptions.
The Polish and Belgian delegates supported the United Kingdom
position to retain the navigational error and fire exceptions although the
Belgian delegate did not agree that the negligent management exception
might be dropped.
The Belgian delegate proposed a text to simplify the policy-based
exceptions as follows:
a. The carrier shall be liable for loss or damage to the goods during the
carriage of same and arising or resulting from his fault or neglect or that of
his servants or agents.
b. In the case of shipwreck, stranding or collision the carrier will not be
liable when the incident arises or results from a fault or neglect of the
captain, a member of the crew or pilot in a navigational operation.
c. In the case of an explosion or fire the carrier shall only be liable when
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the claimant proves that the incident arises or results from the fault or
neglect of the carrier or his agents or servants.
d. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 the fault or neglect
shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved.
To the United States this draft proposal would have been a drastic
expansion of the carrier's policy-based defenses in that the Fire Defense
would be expanded to explosions.
Although preferring to harmonize the Maritime Rules with the
Warsaw Convention, Egypt eventually submitted a proposed text as
follows:
"a. The carrier shall be liable for all loss or damage to the goods
carried occurring while the goods were in his charge unless he proves that
he, his agents or servants have taken all necessary measures to avoid
damage or that it was impossible for them to take such measures.
b. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage
resulting or arising from
1) fire, if the carrier proves that the fire was not caused by his act or
that of his agents or servants;
2) perils, damages or accidents of the sea or other navigable waters;
3) force majeure;
4) acts of a public authority or of a third party when these acts are
neither foreseeable nor avoidable;
5) acts of the shipper;
6) inherent vice of the goods.
c. The carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage to the goods
resulting from a saving or attempting to save life or property at sea."
When this proposal was criticized by developing states, Egypt stated
that the list of exceptions were merely illustrative and not mandatory.
Subsequently, Egypt came to approve the French proposal, although the
formula respecting the saving of life or property was approved by most
delegates and fitted into a flial draft convention together with other
"deviation" rules.
The United States commented on the compromise nature of the
Harter Act of 1893 whereby the shipper received a warranty of
seaworthiness at the commencement of the voyage together with
suppression of bill of lading clauses exculpating the carrier's failure to
properly care for cargo while the carrier received the defense of negligent
navigation and management of the vessel. The fire exception had been in
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U.S. law since 1851.7 In 1893 Congress believed that the ocean freight
rate was not for carriage only but was also for insurance for losses even
where carrier negligence was not the sole cause, and that in support of
this policy our courts had framed burden of proof rules which were
difficult for the carrier to meet, so that the carrier would be liable for
damage to cargo even where unseaworthiness did not cause or contribute
to the loss.8 8 The original intention was that the carrier have the defense
of negligent navigation for major disasters such as collisions and
groundings, but this had been subverted when the courts in the United
States and other countries permitted the carrier to claim the navigational
fault exception for all acts of ordinary seamanship, thus the courts were
often contradictory in determining when an act was merely incident to
care for cargo or when an act was merely incident to navigation or
-146 U.S.C. 182 (1974).
The first limitation of liability statute in 1851 contained a provision exempting the shipowner
from liability for fire damage unless the fire was caused by "design or neglect of the owner." The
statute evidenced congressional disapproval of the 1848 Supreme Court decision in New Jersey
Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. 343 (1848). The 1924 Hague Rules also
contains a provision exempting the carrier from liability for fire damage unless the fire was caused
by "the actual fault or privity of the owner" Article IV(2)b; COGSA 1304(2)b. "Design or neglect"
and "fault or privity" are apparently synonymous, Accinanto, Ltd. v. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels
Rederi, 199 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 345 U.S. 992 (1953); thus the carrier will not be
liable for the acts of the master and crew members. Consumers Import Co. v. Kabushiki K. K.
Zosenjo, 320 U.S. 249 (1943). COGSA 1308 preserving the limitation of liability act also includes
the Fire Statute, thus there are two concurrent fire exemptions in American law but they are not
given similar treatment in the courts. Thus, the carrier has been accorded a broader fire defense
under the 1851 Statute. See Earle & Stoddart,Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd., 287 U.S. 420
(1932).
IsThe Isis (May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt A.G.) 290 U.S. 333 (1933). In the
United States except as to single ship disaster cases the exception for negligent navigation and
management of vessels is irrelevant because of United States law on joint and several liabilities in
collision cases. United States law on joint liability of both colliding vessels differs widely from that
followed in the rest of the maritime world where the Brussels Collision Convention of 19 10 applies.
Prior to the enactment of the Harter Act the Supreme Court had held that in both to blame
collisions the damages will be divided equally. The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson 58 U.S. 170
(1855), overruled in U.S. v. Reliable Transfer Co. 95 S.Ct. 1708 (1975). The entire damage,
consequential expenses and all payments made to third parties such as cargo owners and personal
injury claimants are divided equally before the limitation of liability figure is applied. The North
Star, 106 U.S. 17 (1882). Also the tort principles of joint and several liability had been held
applicable in admiralty so that the cargo owner could collect his entire loss from one of the colliding
vessels in a both to blame collision, The Alabama and the Gamecock 92 U.S. 695 (1875); The Atlas
93 U.S. 302 (1876), so that the cargo owner had a high degree of protection in these mutual fault
cases which account for the overwhelming number of collision losses.
After enactment of the Harter Act shipowners contended that the negligent navigation defense
had eliminated any direct or indirect liability of the carrier to its own cargo. However, the Supreme
Court's opinion in The Chattahoochee 173 U.S. 540 (1899) concluded that Congress had not
changed the operation of the existing rules of joint and several liability of the carrier to its own cargo
where the defense of negligent navigation would prevent a direct liability. Thus, the cargo interest
does not claim for collision loss from its own carrier but demands 100% of the loss from the other
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management. 89 Difficulties in reconciliation of this area of the law had

resulted in "friction" as noted in the Secretariat Report.
To the United States the United Kingdom argument seemed to
presuppose the worst possible cases; necessitating also a shift from the
present methods of vessel ownership to the single-ship corporation
operating with minimum capital. The United Kingdom felt that courts
would be unlikely to pierce the corporate veil of the single-ship
colliding vessel as joint tort-feasor. When the other colliding vessel sues the carrier for collision
damages it may recover amounts due or paid to third parties. Shipowning interests unsuccessfully
contested this indirect liability as a violation of the Congressional policy expressed in the Harter
Act, but faced with Supreme Court rejection in The Chattahoochee, supra, the carriers added the
"Both to Blame Collision Clause" to bills of lading requiring the cargo owner to indemnify the
carrier for any amount of indirect liability to its own cargo. The Supreme Court had held that such
clause violates public policy. United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. 343 U.S. 236 (1952).
The defense of negligent navigation of COGSA 1304 (2) (a) is used in single ship disaster cases in
American law to deprive cargo owners of their effective remedy against the carrier. See Firestone
Synthetic Fibers Company v. MIS Black Heron, 324 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1963). However the use of
this defense is extremely complicated due to uncertainty as to the proper burder of proof of the
carrier to overcome the carrier's duty to cargo in COGSA 1303 (2) and then to establish the defense
of negligent navigation and management. Thus, in Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinetv. Mondial
United Corp. 316 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1963) the carrier could not meet his burden of proving care for
the cargo so that his defenses of negligent navigation could not be considered.
',
"An error in the navigation of the ship or in her management is an error fundamentally
affecting, primarily, the ship . . . an error in the care of the cargo is an erroneous act or omission
directed principally towards the cargo." (W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 103 (1965)). This
analysis often leads to indistinguishable distinctions. In American law these distinctions have confused the jurisprudence under the Harter Act duty to care for cargo (46 U.S.C. 190) and the exception for negligent navigation under 46 U.S.C. 192 which is conditioned on the owner's due diligence
in furnishing a seaworthy vessel. Thus the carrier may be held liable for cargo damage due to improper discharging procedure causing the vessel to be submerged, The JosephJ. Hock, 20 F.2d. 259
(2d Cir. 1934); failure to care for refrigeration equipment and check temperatures in refrigerated
spaces, Barr v. InternationalMercantileMarine Co., 29 F.2d. 26 (2d Cir. 1928); and failure to close
a cargo-ventilator, W. T. Lockett Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 21 F.2d. 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1927). On the
other hand, the cargo owner has been denied recovery when the damage was due to negligent failure
to inspect cargo holds, The Milwaukee Bridge, 26 F.2d. 327 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 278 U.S. 632
(1928); failure to fasten manhole covers over tanks which caused loss to cargo, The Steel Navigator,
23 F.2d. 590 (2d Cir. 1928); improperly tipping a ship for hull examination causing the vessel to
take on salt water, The Indrani, 177 F. 914 (2d Cir. 19 10); and negligent failure to pump bilges, The
Merida, 107 F. 146 (2d Cir. 1901).
The case law under COGSA on the difference between carrier liability for negligent care of cargo
and the defense of negligent navigation and management is quite as complex as that encountered
under the Harter Act.
The carrier has been held liable for failure to care for the cargo where there has been improper
ventilation (The Rita Sister, 69 F. Supp. 480, (E.D.Pa 1946); stowage of leaking cargo in proximity
to cargo susceptible of damage therefrom (Armco InternationalCorp. v. RederiA/B Dist, 151 F. 2d
5 (2d Cir. 1945); improper refrigeration due to inadequate and inexperienced personnel (Horn v. Cia
de Navegacion Fruco, S.A., 404 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1968); filling a bilge sounding pipe rather than a
double bottom sounding pipe because of indistinct markings (Hydaburg Cooperative Assoc. v.
Alaska S.S. Co., 404 F. 2d 151 (9th Cir. 1968)); failure to take precautions on observing smouldering cargo (American Mail Line Ltd. v. Tokyo Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. 270 F. 2d 499 (9th Cir. 1959)).
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corporation, but the United States pointed out that our experience has
been considerably different.9 0
The United States criticized observations of a division of opinion in
the Working Group between carrier nations and shipper nations, noting
that these distinctions were in fact unclear since many carrier nations
used foreign flags extensively to carry their own foreign trade. All states
desired safe and cheap transport and these goals would not suffer if the
friction in the present legal system was removed.
It was unlikely that solicitation of information from insurance
companies would provide a hard factual basis to determine whether a
change in the law would cause a change in rates since the marine
insurance industry was highly competitive and regarded any information
used in fixing rates as proprietary information to be kept confidential.
There were dangers in overconcentration of insurance risks, but the
proposed suppression of the policy-based exceptions to fault liability
would not remove the need for cargo insurance in view of the principle of
unit limitation, general average liabilities, and overall limitation of
liability by statute or international convention. Also it was conceivable
that a competitive insurance industry would accommodate itself to the
change. Predictions that air passengers and aircraft would become
The carrier has not been liable due to the defense of negligent navigation and management in the
following cases of loss or damage to cargo: injecting water into a hold without inspection because of
an erroneous belief that there was ire therein (Ravenscroft v. United States, 88 F. 2d 418 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 707 (1937)); ballasting erroneously into deep tanks containing cargo rather
than an empty deep tank (FirestoneSynthetic Fibers Co. v. M.S. Black Heron, 324 F. 2d 835 (2d Cir
1963)); failure to inspect plating after severe bump caused during departure from port. (Mississippi
Shipping Co., Inc. v. Zander & Co., 270 F. 2d 345 (5th Cir 1959) vacated as moot 361 U.S. 115
(1960)).
Subsequent cases decided under COGSA have preserved the temptation to litigate, thus the
carrier has been held liable for cargo damage due to failure to provide proper ventilation for cargo:
SchroederBros., Inc. v. The Saturnia,226 F2d. 147 (2d Cir. 1955), Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v.
Matson Navigation Co., 249 F. Supp. 572 (E.D.La. 1966), and GeneralFoods Corp. v. U.S., 104 F.
Supp. 629, (S.D.N.Y. 1952); and for improper loading of wet ores and dry coffee in the same hold,
General Foods Corp. v. The Troubador,98 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). However, there are also
recent cases in which the cargo owner has been denied recovery when the damage was due to water
damage from an overfull ballast tank, General Foods Corp. v. The Mormacsurf,276 F2d. 722 (2d
Cir.) cert. denied 364 U.S. 822 (1960), and Leon Bernstein Co. v. Wilhelmsen, 232 F2d. 771 (5th Cir.
1956). See also India Supply Mission v. West Coast S.S. Co., 327 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1962) cert.
denied 377 U.S. 924 (1963).
Despite these decisions in *hich lower federal courts have attempted to distinguish between
carrier's duty to cargo and the carrier's defense of negligent navigation the United States Supreme
Court has taken a much stricter view of the carrier's defenses. The Supreme Court has not sustained
a defense of negligent navigation or peril of the sea in the face of shipper's proof of carrier's specific
failure to care for cargo. See The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U.S. 199 (1894); Calderon v. Atlas S.S.
Co., 170 U.S. 272 (1898); Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69 (1900); The Germanic, 196 U.S. 589
(1905); Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296 (1934).
91 Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, S.A. 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
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uninsurable at the time of the proposed United States denunciation of
the Warsaw Convention in 1966 had turned out to be unfounded, thus in
the absence of hard economic data it would be necessary to rely on
rational argument and it seemed that conditions requiring the negligent
navigation and management exceptions in 1893 and 1924 had now
disappeared so that the policy-based exceptions to the principle of fault
liability should be suppressed in the new Hague Rules. 9 1
The United States put forth a proposed amendment to the existing
Hague Rules as follows:
Article III
"(1) The carrier shall properly and carefully take over, load, handle,
stow, carry, keep, care for, discharge, and hand over the goods carried.
(2) The carrier shall be required to make the ship seaworthy before the
voyage, at the beginning of the voyage and throughout the voyage.
(3) The carrier shall be required to properly man, equip, and supply the
ship before the voyage, at the beginning of the voyage and throughout the
voyage.
(4) The carrier shall properly and carefully navigate and manage the
ship.
Article IV
(1) In case of loss or damage to goods or cargo covered by the
provisions herein, the claimant shall have the burden of proof to show:
(a) that the claimant is the owner of the goods or is otherwise entitled to
make the claim;
(b) that the loss or damage took place during the period for which the
carrier is responsible;
(c) the physical extent of the damage;
(d) the monetary value of the loss or damage.
(2) Thereafter, the burden of proof shall be on the carrier as to all other
matters. In order to avoid liability, the carrier must establish that neither
the actual fault or neglect of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the
agents or servants of the carrier caused, concurred in, or contributed to the
loss or damage."
Japan opposed any changes to the policy-based exceptions for
negligent navigation, management or fire.
9'See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 497 (1967).
The 1929 Warsaw Convention gave defenses to the carrier if the damage to cargo was, "occasioned by an error in piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in navigation ... " (Art. 20 (2).
These defenses are removed in the 1955 Hague Protocol (Art. X).
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India questioned whether any connection between the liability rules
and either general average or salvage could be shown. While preferring
to operate on the basis of definite information about possible increased
costs, India questioned whether any international authority would be
able to gather the required information in any reasonable time. India
then urged the removal of any policy-based exceptions from the general
principle of fault liability, noting that the Hague Rules had been
prepared under the shipowner's influence in an earlier time which did not
match the conditions found today in international trade. The Indian
position was supported by the delegations of Brazil, Nigeria, Singapore,
Spain and Tanzania.
France again urged the rejection of any attempt merely to modify the
old Hague Rules, noting that the existing distribution of liabilities caused
duplication of insurance coverage and increased costs of shipment.
France doubted that any connection could be shown between change in
the system of liability and increased freight rates since the competitive
insurance industry would soon find a way to resolve problems created by
such changes. France then proposed a single simple statement of the
entire problem of liability, defenses, and burden of proof, as follows:
The carrier shall be liable for all loss or damage to the goods carried
occurring from the time when the carrier has taken over the goods until the
time when he has delivered them. The carrier shall not be liable if he can
prove that the loss or damage resulted through circumstances which the
carrier, his agents or servants, could neither foresee nor avoid and the
consequences of which he was unable to prevent. The burden of proof shall
be on the carrier to show that neither the actual fault or privity or act of
the carrier nor the fault or neglect or act of the agents or servants of the
carrier contributed to or concurred in the loss or damage.
The final recommendation of the Drafting Committee came fairly
close to this French proposal, but not until all texts which attempted to
state a positive rule of liability together with positive rules for the burden
of proof had been exhausted. The language is now found in Article 5 of
the Draft Convention, and should be compared with Article VI of the
1971 Guatemala Protocol to the Warsaw Convention.
The U.S.S.R. noted that the exceptions for negligent navigation and
management and fire had been added to recent Soviet legislation
recodifying the law with respect to cargo damage. The U.S.S.R.
proposed that the Working Group report two texts-one containing the
policy exceptions and one deleting them. Belgium supported this
proposal but in view of the.subsequent general criticism of the dual text
approach, the U.S.S.R. delegate proposed retention of the exceptions
but that they be put in brackets.
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At the conclusion of this preliminary debate on Rules for Carrier
Responsibility, the Chairman surveyed the opinions which had been
expressed and noted that the majority seemed to favor deletion of any
reference to seaworthiness and the view that the carrier should be
affirmatively liable for fault causing loss or damage to cargo. There
should be no policy-based exception for negligent navigation and
management. Most nations clearly favored the suppression of the Hague
Rules catalogue of defenses (Art. IV (2) (c)-(p)). The nations supporting these conclusions were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Egypt,
France, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Tanzania
and United States. Nations opposing deletion of the negligent navigation
exception were Belgium, Japan, Poland, U.S.S.R., and United Kingdom. No formal vote was taken, but the subject was referred to the
Drafting Committee with the understanding that the majority position
would be reflected in the draft and that those nations opposed would
reserve their position.
During the Drafting Committee's deliberations, the debate on the
policy-based exceptions continued under the guise of an attempt to draft
a general formula for stating affirmatively that the carrier's liability
would be based on fault. The basis for discussion in the Drafting Group
was Paragraph 269 of the Secretariat Report (A/CN.9/63/Add.l) of
December 3, 1971, which was redrafted as Paragraph 42 of the Working
Paper prepared by the Secretariat for the September meeting (A/
CN.9/W.G.III/WP.6 of 31 Aug 72).
The Secretariat's draft language, which was the basis for many
subsequent drafting attempts, was drawn from the European Road and
Rail Conventions (CIM and CMR), and was as follows:
"The carrier shall be liable for all loss or damage to the goods carried
occurring while in the charge of the carrier. However, the carrier shall not
be liable if the loss or damage resulted through circumstances which the
carrier could not avoid and the consequences of which he was unable to
prevent.
The burden of proof shall be on the claimant to show:
(a) that the claimant is the owner of the goods or is othewise entitled to
make the claim;
(b) that the loss or damage took place during the period for which
carrier is responsible;
(c) the physical extent of the loss or damage;
(d) the monetary value of the loss or damage.
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The burden of proof shall be on the carrier as to all other matters; to
avoid liability the carrier must show that neither the actual fault or
privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of
the carrier caused, concurred in or contributed to the loss or damage."
As a result of the first discussions of the Drafting Group, there was a
consensus in favor of the following text:
"(1) The carrier shall be liable for all loss or damage to goods carried if
the occurrence which caused the loss or damage took place while the goods
were in his charge.
(2) However, the carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage arising
without fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents.
(3) The carrier shall have the burden of proving that the loss or damage
arose without fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or
agents.
(4) Where the carrier's fault concurs with another cause to produce loss
or damage, the carrier shall be liable only for that portion of the loss or
damage attributable to its fault, provided that the carrier bears the burden
of proving the amount of loss or damage not attributable to its fault."
At the Drafting Party, the United States considered the draft language
in the light of modern tort theory, specifically, the view that modern law
permits claimants merely to show injury or damage plus causation,
thereafter the issue of liability being determined by the nature of the
defenses which would be admitted. The U.S. supported the removal of
the list of 17 specific defenses on the ground that disputes would
hereafter be concerned with facts rather than the historical meaning of
the wording used in the 17 defenses of Article IV. The language to be
chosen to state the burden of proof must be clear because of the danger of
conflicting interpretation which might evolve wherein one court might
exonerate the carrier who shows that he is usually careful by use of
impressive experts, whereas other courts would not exonerate the carrier
unless he shows that in the specific instance he did all that could be done
at the time and place.
The U.S. view was supported by Ghana and Spain.
Nigeria proposed a "horse-trader's compromise" whereby the defense
of negligent navigation would be removed while the fire exception would
be retained.
Brazil proposed that the only defense would be "vis maior" or "force
majeure" but that there was uncertainty as to whether the defenses
should be named specifically or be derived from the rule on burden of
proof.
Norway proposed that the Drafting Group should achieve as much
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agreement as possible on other aspects of risk allocation before
discussing the policy based exceptions. Also, the language in Article III
concerning seaworthiness was antique and should be removed by reason
of the proposed consolidation of all liability and burden of proof rules
into a single article, and the category of 15 non-policy based defenses be
stricken while the topic of deviation to save life be set aside for
consideration at a later meeting. A general consensus did develop for the
deletions of the concept of seaworthiness and the catalogue of defenses.
Norway eventually proposed that the new rule be framed as follows:
"The carrier shall be liable for loss of or damage to the goods occurring
while the goods are in his charge except to the extent that such loss or
damage has arisen without fault or neglect on the part of the carrier or his
agents or servants."
"The carrier shall have the burden of proving the extent to which the
loss or damage has arisen without fault or neglect on his part. However, if
loss or damage has been caused by fire, the burden of proving that the fire
was due to fault or neglect on the part of the carrier or his agents or
servants, shall be on the shipper or consignee."
Spain proposed to state the rule very simply,
"The carrier shall be liable for loss or damage to the goods during their
carriage, unless he can establish the occurrence which caused it and show
that neither he nor his agents or servants could avoid this occurrence and
its consequences by using due diligence."
France preferred to adhere to its original draft, although the French
delegate said he could accept the Spanish proposal with a modification,
thus,
"The carrier shall be liable for loss or damage to the goods while in the
charge of the carrier. However, the carrier shall not be liable if he proves
that the event which caused the loss or damage could not have been
prevented. To this end, the carrier shall be required to prove that he and
his servants have taken all measures that could reasonably be required to
avoid the loss or damage (in the particular case)."
After lengthy and heated discussions there was a consensus in behalf of
the following statement of the basic rule on liability including a
non-controversial rule (paragraph 3) on the carrier's burden of apportioning concurrent cause 92 , as follows:
92 Where carrier negligence is a concurrent cause of damage together with one of the causes
excepted in COGSA 1304 (2) Article IV (2), the carrier has the heavy, if not impossible, burden of
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"(1) The carrier shall be liable for all loss of or damage to goods carried if
the occurrence which caused the loss or damage took place while the goods
were in his charge as defined in article ( ], unless the carrier proves that
he, his servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be
required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.
(2) In case of fire, the carrier shall be liable, provided the claimant proves
that the fire arose due to fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, his
servants or agents.
(3) Where fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, his servants or
agents, concurs with another cause to produce loss or damage, the carrier
shall be liable only for that portion of the loss or damage attributable to
such fault or negligence, provided that the carrier bears the burden of
proving the amount of loss or damage not attributable thereto."
The following subsidiary comments were made part of the Formal
Text:
"(4) The Drafting Party recommends the foregoing text as a compromise
of the divergent views on the subject of carrier's responsibility.
(5) The text prepared by the Drafting Party would replace articles 3 (1)
and 3 (2) and articles 4 (1) and 4 (2) of the Brussels Convention of 1924.
(6) The Drafting Party further recommends that the question of 'saving or
attempting to save life or property at sea' (article 4 (2) (1)) be considered at
the February 1973 session, in connexion with the consideration of
'deviation' under article 4 (4), which also, inter alia, deals with saving or
attempting to save life or property at sea."
The above language appeared to be the only possible compromise
available. While it might be regretted that the policy based exception for
fire was retained, nevertheless some refinement of the language might be
attempted later after the question had been reexamined at leisure instead
of attempting another exhausting debate. The United States could,
however, be content because proof of origin of fire was always difficult
and experience showed that fire damage was often the result of
apportioning losses between concurring causes and proving the amount of damage for which the
carrier would not be liable. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Lloyd Brasileiro, 159 F2d. 661 (2d
Cir.) cert. denied 331 U.S. 836 (1947). A Supreme Court case decided under the Harter Act held
that the carrier had to bear the entire loss of a cargo of spoiled onions, where the loss to cargo was
caused by failure to care for cargo (closing of ventilating hatches in fair weather) and peril of the sea
(closing of ventilating hatches in heavy weather). Schnell v. The Vallescura,293 U.S. 296 (1934). In
order to escape liability the carrier must prove, onion by onion, how much spoilage was due to
closure of the ventilating hatches in heavy weather. The Supreme Court's view of burden of proof in
cargo damage cases seems clear,
"... the carrier is charged with the responsibility for a loss which, in fact, may not be due to
his fault, merely because the law, in pursuance of a wise policy, casts on him the burden of
showing facts relieving him from liability." 293 U.S. 307
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spontaneous heating and combustion in the cargo. Thus, the United
States had had special legislation on fire since 1851. Other delegations,
such as France, Egypt and Spain, indicated their support was based on
the fact of compromise only and that they disapproved the lack of legal
symmetry in the draft.
The text which was adopted on fire was hurriedly adopted after verbal
proposals of U.K. Belgium, and Norway had not been able to muster
support; although there had been a greater amount of support for a
proposal that read as follows,
"However, if the loss or damage arose from a fire the carrier shall be
relieved of his burden of proof if he has adduced all the evidence available
to him concerning the origin of the fire."
India, Tanzania, Ghana, and Singapore pressed for the complete
elimination of the fire exception and it was on the proposal of Nigeria
that the compromise text on fire was adopted, the language having been
taken from an earlier Norwegian Draft.
At the Plenary the United States noted that it was not satisfied with
the fire proposal but that it could be accepted as a compromise. Ghana,
Spain, France and Singapore made specific reservations to the fire
exception.
In the closing minutes of the Plenary Spain proposed a new text on fire
which was not considered by the Plenary,
"However, if the loss or damage is the result of fire, the carrier shall not
be liable if he proves that the ship had suitable means to avert the fire arid
that he, his servants and agents, took all reasonable measures to avoid it
and reduce its consequences, unless the claimant proves the fault or
negligence of the carrier, his servants or agents."
During the Second Reading the United States returned to the problem
of the language of the fire proposal, offering the Spanish draft, with the
rationale that while the carrier's general defense of "all measures that
could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences" is also applicable in the fire situation, nevertheless the fire
defense would be applicable in a more narrow and specific factual area
when the carrier proves that, "the ship had suitable means to avert the
fire." The United States and Australia were agreed about the need for a
change in the fire exception language. Norway, however, urged that the
situations were really indistinguishable, and in view of the compromise
nature of the entire text on the General Rules of Liability, no changes
should be made. The United States, however, believed that in view of the
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major effort being made at that time by Belgium, Poland, Japan, U.K.
and U.S.S.R. to retain the defense of negligent navigation and management, that it would be appropriate to open the fire question also, however
the Working Group voted to preserve the compromise fire text intact.
At the Plenary of the Fourth Session U.K, stated a preference for
the Belgian Draft Proposal on navigational fault, but indicated that the
U.K. could support the compromise text if there were a suitable revision
of the amount of unit limitation of liability.
Japan, Poland, Belgium and the U.S.S.R. made specific reservations
to the compromise text and urged the retention of the exception on
navigational fault.
During the Second Reading the C.M.I. observer, supported by
Belgium, Poland, Japan, U.K. and U.S.S.R. attempted to restore the
policy based defense of negligent navigation and management. Economic
arguments were made, but the information available to the Second
Reading in February, 1975 was essentially the same as had been
available in October, 1972; no hard data being available from which a
definite decision can be made. The United States, however, believed that
if the 1893 policy based exception of negligent navigation and management was to reappear, that these would not be new Hague Rules but a
mere reshuffling of the old rules, accordingly the colossal absurdity of
negligent navigation-a major exception to the normal rules of principal
and agent in common law, civil law and socialist law, should be
suppressed. There was concern, however, during the Second Reading,
whether there was still a majority of the Working Group in favor of the
compromise text in view of the absence of Argentina, Spain (no longer a
member of UNCITRAL) and Tanzania, and some uncertainty about the
positions of other member states. Nevertheless, upon a vote of the
Working Group, twelve states supported the existing compromise text,
without the defense of negligent navigation while five states voted to
reintroduce the exception.
The language of the General Rules on Liability, containing therein the
burden of proof rule and defenses, had to be reexamined in the light of
the discussion of deviation to save life and property at the Fifth Session
and damages for delay in delivery at the Sixth Session. The General
Rules are now found in Article 5 of the Draft Convention, as follows:
1. The carrier shall be liable for loss, damage or expense resulting from
loss of or damage to the goods, as well as from delay in delivery, if the
occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took place while the
goods were in his charge as defined in article 4, unless the carrier proves
that he, his servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be
required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.
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4. In case of fire, the carrier shall be liable, provided the claimant
proves that the fire arose due to fault or negligence on the part of the
carrier, his servants or agents.

7. Where fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, his servants or
agents, concurs with another cause to produce loss, damage or delay in
delivery the carrier shall be liable only for that portion of the loss, damage
or delay in delivery attributable to such fault or negligence, provided that
the carrier bears the burden of proving the amount of loss, damage or
delay in delivery not attributable thereto.
E. Arbitration Clauses
Although the 1924 Hague Rules contained no provisions on arbitration, clauses in the bill of lading calling for arbitration of disputes were
beginning to be found, although not so frequently as with charter parties
where arbitration has become the sole method of dispute resolution. In
addition to the intentional incorporation of arbitration clauses in bills of
lading there were instances of the incorporation by reference of an
93
arbitration clause from a charter party into the bill of lading.
The Secretariat Report noted that regulation of the subject of
jurisdiction clauses by the new rules could result in more widespread use
of arbitration clauses in printed form bills of lading as carriers attempt to
control the situs of claims more closely, accordingly Paragraphs 127-149
of the Report considered the topic which was then taken up at the Third
Session. In the discussions in the Working Group a consensus developed
that there should be some reference made to arbitration clauses in the
proposed revision of the Hague Rules. In the Drafting Party, however, a
substantial split developed over how the subject should be treated.
There was a limited consensus in favor of a Draft Proposal of the
Secretariat (Para. 113) giving the plaintiff a range of locations in which
to choose an arbitral forum.
1. In legal proceedings arising out of the contract of carriage,
provision may be made in the contract for arbitration proceedings in
accordance with an arbitration clause. These proceedings may take
91Son Shipping Co. v. De Fosse & Tanghe, 199 F.2d (687 (2d Cir. 1952); Instituto Cubano de
Estabilizacion Del Azucar v. The Golden West, 128 F. Supp. 754 (S.D.N.Y., 1955) See also
McMahon, The Hague Rules and Incorporation of Charter Party Arbitration Clauses into Bills of
Lading, 2. J Mar. L. & Comm. 1 (1970).
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place, at the option of the plaintiff, in a contracting State within whose
territory is situated:
(a) the principal place of business of the carrier or the carrier's branch
or agency through which the contract of carriage was made; or
(b) the place where the goods were taken in charge by the carrier; or
(c) the place designated in the contract for delivery of the goods to the
consignee; or
(d) the place designated in the contract of carriage [or selected by the
person or body designated in the arbitration clause].
2. The arbitration clause shall state that the designated arbitrator must
apply this Convention; otherwise, such clauses shall be null and void.
3. After a dispute has arisen, the parties may eater into an agreement
selecting the territory of any contracting State as the place of arbitration [or
any person or body in a contracting State]. The parties may agree that the
arbitrator shall act as an amiable compositeur.

The United States believed it could not support this proposal because
location of the arbitration in and of itself is substantially less important
than the specific provisions for selection of arbitrators and the specification as to what rules of a procedural and substantive nature will be
applicable in addition to the new Hague Rules.
Furthermore, the designation of the place of arbitration in the bill of
lading would bring up the arguments about adhesion "agreements"
violating public policy by forcing the abandonment of small claims where
the carrier chooses arbitration sites at great distance from the shipper.
France supported the introduction of a more complicated formula
which permits the inclusion of arbitration clauses in bills of lading but
requires application of subparagraph (a) (1) of the jurisdiction clause to
select the place where the arbitration would be held as well as request
that the provisions of the convention be applied in the arbitral proceedings.
The Soviet Union, supported by Hungary and Poland, argued strongly
in favor of complete freedom for carriers to include provisions in bills of
lading providing for arbitration. These States were probably prepared to
accept the formula requiring the application of the revised Hague Rules
by the arbitrators. Some of the major ship-owning States, such as Japan,
also indicated support for this type of approach.
The Soviet Union and other states with centrally planned economies
will not tolerate preventing recourse, within the maritime bill of lading
system, to the arbitral system which is a standard feature of their
commercial transactions.
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Argentina, Chile, Spain and France offered a draft proposal, with
United States support under which arbitration could be agreed to by the
parties only after the occurrence of the event which gave rise to the claim.
The split in approach was such that the drafting party was unable to
make any recommendation to the Working Group. As a result the
Working Group decided to defer discussion of the matter until its next
meeting.
At the Fourth Session Plenary Spain again introduced the proposal to
which the U.S., Argentina, and Chile had given support previously. The
language incorporated by the Secretariat in Draft Proposal F (Para. 26
A/CN.9/WG.III/W.P.7), is as follows,
"Notwithstanding the provision of the preceding paragraphs [on
jurisdiction clauses], after the occurrence of an event giving rise to a claim
the parties may agree on a jurisdiction where legal action may be
commenced or submit the case to arbitration for a final decision in
accordance with the rules of this convention."
At the February session the U.S.S.R. Delegate had proposed the
following alternative texts on arbitration clauses, which were made
part of the Secretariat Report (Paragarphs 6 and II of A/CN.9/
WGIII/W.P.7)
Alternative A
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article [...dealing
with jurisdictional matters.. .] arbitration clauses in a contract of carriage
shall be allowed provided the designated arbitration shall take place within
a contracting state and shall apply the [substantive] rules of this
Convention.
(Art. 32 of the Warsaw Convention (para. 134 of the Secretariat
Report) and Draft Proposal E (para. 147 of the Report).

Alternative B
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article [...dealing
with jurisdiction matters ... ] arbitration clauses in a contract of carriage
shall be allowed provided it has been thereby stipulated that the arbitral
body or arbitrators designated in the contract:
(a) shall apply the [substantive] rules of this Convention, and
(b) shall hold the [arbitration] proceedings within a contracting State at
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one of the places referred to in [the said] Article [...] or at the place
chosen by such arbitral body or arbitrators.
(Art. 32 of the Warsaw Convention (para. 134 of the Secretariat
Report) and Draft Proposals D and E (paras. 141 and 147 of the Report).
Alternative F, favored by U.S., Spain, Chile and Argentina was at the
one extreme of the spectrum on arbitration clauses and Alternatives A
and B favored by U.S.S.R., Japan and Poland were at the other extreme.
Alternative E restricts the validity of arbitration clauses in advance of
the dispute and Alternatives A and B offer the least amount of restraint.
The extreme positions did not pick up additional support after the
Plenary, thus the Plenary referred the entire subject to the Drafting
Group but with a recommendation that compromise be sought along the
lines of Draft Proposal D, favored by Tanzania, Nigeria, India and
Egypt or Draft Proposal E, favored by Belgium, Singapore, U.K.,
Australia, Norway, France, and Brazil.
Draft Proposal E which had the seven supporters listed above provides
as follows,
"1. In legal proceedings arising out of the contract of carriage, provision may be made in the contract for arbitration proceedings in accordance with an arbitration clause. These proceedings may take place,
at the option of the plaintiff, in a [contracting] State within whose territory
is situated:
(a) The principal place of business of the carrier or the carrier's branch
or agency through which the contract of carriage was made; or
(b) The place where the goods were taken in charge by the carrier; or
(c) The place designated in the contract for delivery of the goods to the
consignee;, or
(d) The place designated in the contract of carriage [or selected by the
person or body designated in the arbitration clause].
2. The arbitration clause shall state that the designated arbitrator must
apply this Convention; otherwise, such clause shall be null and void.
3. After a dispute has arisen, the parties may enter into an agreement
selecting the territory of any [contracting) state as the place of arbitration
[or any person or body in a contracting state]. The parties may agree that
the arbitrator shall act as an amiable compositeur."
The French Delegate proposed to add the following language in two
alternate forms to modify Draft Proposal E in the second paragraph,
"Alternative I
The arbitration clause shall, on pain of nullity, provide that the
arbitrator appointed shall apply this Convention and any award which
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fails to apply the Convention shall be null and void unless, in virtue of a
special provision of the contract of carriage, the said contract is subject to
application of the Convention.
Alternative 2

No arbitration clause or agreement shall be valid unless it provides that
the arbitrator appointed shall apply this Convention and any award which
fails to apply the Convention shall be null and void unless, in virtue of a
special provision of the contract of carriage, the said contract is subject to
application of the convention."
During the Drafting Group's Preliminary Discussions of Draft
Proposal E a consensus rapidly developed that the convention must be
applied in all arbitrations and that post-dispute arbitration agreements
may name the situs of the proceeding, and a majority of the Drafting
Group agreed that the principles of Draft Proposal E should conform to
the principles previously agreed on for jurisdiction clauses. This majority
consisted of Belgium, Egypt, Australia, Norway, France, India, U.K.,
Singapore, and Brazil. Spain and USSR also indicated they could
support Draft Proposal E.
Hungary, speaking for land-locked countries, said the new Convention
must make provision for arbitrations at places other than the ports of
loading or discharge so that arbitrations can be held in the land-locked
countries.
Norway said that five principles must govern the choice of a Draft
Proposal:
a. Arbitration must apply the rules of the convention;
b. Situs of arbitrations must be fairly restricted to prevent abuses;
c. Situs choice should depend on objective criteria of convenience,
presumably place of delivery of goods to the carrier or the consignee;
d. Arbitrations should be in contracting states;
e. Arbitrations should be under conditions of certainty as to the rules to
be applied, thus, there can be no provision for a compositeuramiable.
Australia preferred draft Proposal E but indicated that provision
must be made so that the applicant will always have the right to arbitrate
in his own country.
Argentina noted that the jurisprudence of his country would never
confer validity on any clause which would oust the jurisdiction of
Argentine courts.
The United States noted that the U.S. had always regarded arbitration
of commercial disputes as desirable and to that end there had been a
federal arbitration statute for fifty years. 94 Furthermore, the United

122

Journalof Maritime Law and Commerce

Vol. 7. No. 1

States had ratified the 1958 U.N. Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 96 which had been previously
ratified by eleven other UNCITRAL members. The United States could
support Draft Proposal E, provided that the arbitration situs would not
be named in the adhesion agreement prepared by the shipowner.
Long-term changing patterns of world trade may replace break-bulk
shipments with bulk and container shipments where shippers would be
large commercial or state trading organizations on an economic equality
with carriers, however, at the present time small shippers of break-bulk
cargo must be protected from wasteful arbitration of small claims in
distant places. The United States noted that Draft Proposal F would
permit the parties to select the procedures for arbitration at their leisure
but that any of the other Draft Proposals would require additional
procedural provisions respecting minimal standards to be applied in any
arbitration under the new Convention. To that end he proposed that
there be an annex to any Arbitration provisions of the new convention
which would deal with the following subjects:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

stay of legal proceedings pending arbitration;
compulsory arbitration where one party refuses to arbitrate;
choice of panel members voluntarily or involuntarily;
requirement of reasoned decision at the time of the award;
use of equitable principles;
the grounds for appealing the award;
enforcement of the award.

There was support of this proposal from Spain and Argentina but
most speakers thereafter expressed disapproval. The U.S. also proposed
an amendment to Draft Proposal E, "An arbitral decision in contravention of the provisions of this Convention shall be null and void and of no
effect."
The U.S. also proposed an amendment to the language of Draft
Proposal E requiring that the arbitration be held in contracting states.
Although universality was the ideal, yet even after fifty years many states
had not ratified or adhered to the Hague Rules, accordingly the
following language taken from Article 60 of the I.M.C.O. Treaty should
be used:
"The word 'State' within the meaning of Article (.... jurisdiction
arbitration clauses) shall be deemed to mean
clause) and Article ( ....
94 U.S.C. 1-10 (1974). See also.M/S Bremen and Unterweser Reederei GMBH v. Zapata
Offshore Co., 407 U.S. I(1972).
95Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958.
21 U.S.T 2517; T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3;entered into force for the United States, Dec.
29, 1970.
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contracting state at such time as instruments of ratification shall have been
deposited with the (U.N. Secretariat) by (25) states of which (5) must
possess merchant fleets in excess of (1,000,000) deadweight tons."
There was a general consensus in favor of this amendment, however the
Secretariat proposed, with the concurrence of a majority of the members
of the Drafting Group that the actual formulation of the proposal be
deferred until the new Convention shall have been completely drafted.
After two days of discussions there was considerable support for a
modification of Draft Proposal E along the following lines,
"I. Arbitration proceedings instituted pursuant to an agreement in a
contract of carriage shall, at the option of the claimant, be held in:
a. the principal place of business or in the absence thereof the ordinary
residence of the carrier or the place designated in the contract of carriage
provided that it is not the principal place of business or the ordinary
residence of the carrier;
b. the state in whose territory is situated the port of loading;
c. the state in whose territory is situated the port of discharge; or
d. the place designated in the contract of carriage provided that this
place is not situated in a state within whose territory is situated the
principal place of business or in the absence thereof the ordinary residence
of the claimant.
2. The arbitration agreement shall be valid only if it states that the
provisions of this Convention shall be-applied in the Arbitration proceeding or if the contract of carriage otherwise provides that the provision of
this Convention shall apply."

After two more days of debate the Drafting Group majority supported
the following revision, which was eventually approved by the Drafting
Group.
"(1) Subject to the rules of this article, any clause or agreement referring
disputes that may arise under a contract of carriage to arbitration shall be
allowed.
"(2) The arbitration proceedings shall, at the option of the plaintiff, be
instituted at one of the following places:
(a) A place in a State within whose territory is situated
(i) The port of loading or the port of discharge, or
(ii) The principal place of business of the defendant or, in the
absence thereof, the ordinary residence of the defendant, or
(iii) The place where the contract was made, provided that the
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defendant has there a place of business, branch or agency
through which the contract was made; or
(b) Any other place designated in the arbitration clause or agreement.
"(3) The arbitrator(s) or arbitration tribunal shall apply the rules of this
Convention.
"(4) The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall be deemed
to be part of every arbitration clause or agreement, and any term of such
clause or agreement which is inconsistent therewith shall be null and void.
"(5) Nothing in this article shall affect the validity of an agreement
relating to arbitration made by the parties after the claim under the
contract of carriage has arisen."
At the closing Plenary the United States reserved its position with
respect to Para. 2b of the Proposed Draft. Ghana, Egypt, Tanzania and
Spain also joined in making reservations to Para. 2b. In addition, Spain
made a proposal that the choice of specific arbitrators in advance be
forbidden. The Soviet Union reserved its position in favor of Draft
Proposal A.
At the Second Reading the above draft was approved without change,
and the Arbitration provisions are now incorporated in Article 22 of the
Draft Convention.

End of the first part of the article. Subsequent issues of the Journal
will contain the remaining parts in the following order:
Fijth Session
F.
G.
H.
I.

The Unit Limitation of Liability, exclusive of the amount
Transshipment
Deviation
The Period of Limitation of Actions or Time Bar.
Sixth Session

J.
K.
L.
M.
N.

Liability for Delay
Geographic and Documentary Scope of the Convention
Invalid Clauses in Bills of Lading
Reconsideration of Deck Cargo and Live Animals
Definitions

Hague Rules

Octobet 1975

125

Seventh Session
0.

Contents and Legal Effect of Documents evidencing The Contract of
Carriage
P. Letters of Guarantee
Eighth Session

Q.
R.
S.
T.

Liability of the Shipper
Dangerous Goods
Notice of Loss Provisions
Derogations from the Convention.

